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PREFACE 
This study concentrates on the .activities of Gustavus V. Fox, 
Union Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Civil War. The. investi-
gation considers the role that Fox played in shaping the plans and pol-
icies of the Union Navy during that conflict. The obvious fact emerges 
that_Fox wa; the official of foremost i~po-rt~nce in the Navy Department 
'in planning all the major naval opel:'ations undertaken .by that branch of 
the service d~ring the Civil War. 
For aid on _this paper I gratefully acknowledge the following: Mr. 
Alton Juhlin, · Head of the Special Services Department of the University 
Library, for able help in acquiring needed materials for my study; Dr. 
Theodore L. Agnew, _ wh<J critically read an·d willing assisted ·at all times; . 
Dr. Norbert R. Mahnken, who brought clarity and style to my subject; Dr. 
. . 
Homer· L. Knight, Head of the Department of History, who generously ad-
vhed me in my work and encouraged ·this research effort; and Dr. John 
J. Beer, who taught me that there i~ more to writing than ·putting woras 
on paper. Finally, I deeply appreciate the assistance of Dr. LeRoy H. 
Fischer, without whose help and g~idanc;e th,is_Paper could not have been 
written. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE YEARS BEFORE 
Gustavus Vasa Fox barely missed being ranked among ou~ ablest 
,, 
statesmen of the Civil War. An administrator and executive of exception-
able ability, he served in a subordinate capacity, and was thus deprived 
of the opportunity which might have provided him with a wider scope for 
his talents. As the Union Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the 
1861-1865, conflict, ,he had nearly five stirring years, during which he 
stood side by side with the nation's leaders,. respected and consulted 
both by AoDaham Lincoln and Ulysses s. Grant. He was personally respon-
sible for some of the most brilliant of the Union successes on the 
water. He was described by one observer as "the one really able man of 
the Lincoln administration. 11 1 Then, almost suddenly, his opportunity 
for distinction passed, and he retired to the obscurity of business, 
seldom to be heard of again. 
This man from ,Massachusetts who was so vital to the Union in the 
Navy Department was born into humble circumstances on June 13, 1821, in 
Saugus, Essex County, Massachusetts, the sort of Dr . Jesse and Oliva 
(Flint) Fox. His father was a country physici,an of moderate circum-
stances and thus was unable to give his son the advantages of a classi-
cal education. The elder Fox moved his family from Saugus to Lo~ell in 
·
1claude Fuess, "Gustavus Vasa Fox," Phillips Bulletin, XIV (19.27), 
27 • . H~reil~te,!· cited as Fuess , "Gustavus \tasa Fox," Phillips Bulletin. 
'! t' , )j . I ~ ' ! • I j, •j .} 1! .. :• ). ' .. r !"'.J_l : • 
1 
I 
1823 when Gustavus was two years old. It was here that Fox received his 
education, in the conunon schoo:i.s· of that town. 
As a young boy, .d~spite a lingering interest in the ministry, Fox 
. . 
was fascinated by ships and became convinced that a naval career was . 
his goal. Accordingly, he entered P.hillips Academy, at Andover, 
) . 
Mas's~chusetts in the fall of 1835, to prepare 'himself for such a <;:art!er. 
Rows of wooden conunons had recently been completed at the school,' but 
Fox preferred to live in a private house. As· a result, the.young naval 
enthusiast spent his two-year term at Andover living at a nMrs. Brown's" 
boarding h~.use.2 
Yoµng Fox was another in a long line of distinguished Essex County 
men whose names were on the rolls of Phillips Academy •. Fox left Ando-
ver ·at the age of 16, .s.chool having .closed on the second Wednes.day Jn 
J • • • ' 
August. Throughout tha:t year Fox had · ..been hesitating between .the mJnis-
try and the navy but when he received an appointm,ent as a midshipman at 
. ' 
th.e United States N~val Academy ~t Annapolis, 1!,e eagerly accepted. 3 
i 
Two years later, in 1839, Fox made his fir~t cruise, to·· the. Medi-
terranean on_the Cyane, witll·Captain Johri. Percival. Ris service at sea 
while in the Academy .:was in time of pe_ace, and though few incidents 
occurred, his was not altogether a fair weather experience. He was on 
board the Saratoga in Novemb,er. of 1839 during a winter storm when, 
after having passed out ,of the harbor of Portsmouth, she was unable 
•, ,, ·. . ' ' 
either to proc,ed or return and though anchored off shore, c.ould not furl 
hElr s~ils.4 
2Fu.ess, "Gustavus Vasa Fox/' Phillips Bulletin; XIV, 28. 
4charles Boynton, History~~~ During the Rebellion, (2 vols~, 
New York: D. Appleton and Co.,_ 1867), I, 58. Hereafter eiteiLas. 
Boynton, History of_~~ During the ·Rebellion. 
3 
.::0 ... --".~ ... 
The ship cool~-c,~:ii be saveid,'by c·utting away her masts- and despite 
------
great suffering by the cr~w, this'was done. Sub$El:quently, he was on 
board the lll'l\deplm.den.ce, a fifty gun ship, connnanded by Connnodore·Charles 
Stewart.(who ti'as to be of great help to Fox 0 s plan innnediately preceding 
the Fort Sumter expedition) in August of 1840, .. when t~e ship was struck 
by a white squall. The situation became critical after the fi3::st blast 
~early laid the ship on her beam ends, tore away the head sails, and 
" broke the main yard. With the h.ead sails gone, the ship could not be 
brought around before the wind and it looked as if ,the vessel was leaning 
so far over as to fill with water. 5 In. this emergency Fox exhibited 
the courage and coolness·that characterized his naval career and his 
Fort Sumter expedition. Acting with lightning speed, he shouted to 
Co~odore Stewart for permission-to tl:')' to·right the ship,_ which was 
'. 
immediately grai.nted. Fox then led the crew to the fore ri~ging where 
the wind acted upon them as it would upon a sail. 6 The pla~ worked as 
the ship was brought slowly around and righted as she came before the 
wind. 
Fox graduated from the Academy as an apprentice midshipman in 1841 
, and three years later passed the examination for midshipman at Phila-
delphia. Hen.ext participated in a two year cruise off the coasts of 
Africa and the west Indies. These years were uneventful, but during 
this time Fox ~ained invaluable experience which would greatly benefit 
him in future years. Two years later, in 1846, he was attached to the 
. ' ·. 
coast survey in the. Gulf, 's.ervice which helped to pre~are him to_ judge 
5Boyn.ton, History of ~ !!!!'.l During ~ Rebellion 1 I, 58. 
6 Ibid., 59. _ 
___... 
the important questions conne~ted,with th~ blockade during the Civil 
. . . ' ' 
.·, 
Wa_r. The following year found .. Fox with -Commodore Mathew c. Perry's 
. ii"·. 
squadron·on board the Washingtoq,~ participating in the operations of 
. . 
tha~ squadron against the Mexican coast and ports. ~ereafter, in 1;~e1 
Mexican W~r, he was OCCU\)ied ,_:with the tran~portation .iJ_f, ti;-oops to Vera 
. ··f 
C~z. ···He was learning now, for the' first ;~e,_ something of the .opera-
tions of.actual i;aval warfare. After the end of the war; Fox sailed to 
Brazil and th~ East ladies as acting ma~t~r of the Plymou_th;. two years 
later· he. joined the Dolphin as e~ecutive office'f- and vi_s,~ted the islands 
of the Pacific, plus Calif<:>rnia. and the west coast of $outh AJn~rica, re-
turning by Cape Horn. 
The first year of the new decade saw Fox 0 s apJ>ointment to master, 
and the next two years fo_und him as chief executive officer on board 
the mail ste~er Baltic running bet;reen New. York and ~iv~rpool, England •. 
In .December of 1852, having earned his promotion to the rank of lieuten-
.... 
ant, he was ordered to the Princ'.eton, the flagship of a- fishing squadron 
. ,\_. . 
under Commodore William B. Shubrick, who later was very instrumental in 
I • 
giving David Far~agut his chance for fame. In August of the next year 
Fox.was detached and ordered to command the maii steamer~' .run.nin~ 
'· 
between New York and Aspinwall, Panama. In 1854 Fox was transferred to 
the mail streamer George f!!, which ran from New Yofk to Charleston, on 
' . ·'' 
which he served until the following year. With his tour of duty now 
complete, he was detached and granted a o~e year 1 s furlough. 
In July of 1856 Fox resigned his cotmnission in th~ navy, being 
,~r. ·,t~ 
thoroughly disgusted by the use of p91itical influence in the promotional 
~ . ' : ~ ' 
system of that branch of the government.: .After leaving the navy, 
7Boynton, History.£!. the~ »~:ring ~ Rebellion, I; ,59. 
5 
Fox married V~rginia Woodbury, a daughter of Judge Levi Woodbury of 
I . ' . 
Olivia, New Hampshire, and a sister of the wife of Montgomery Bl.air, 
Uter to be Lincoln° s Postmaster General. The former navy officer now 
accepted a positfo_n 'as agent -of the Bay State Woolen Mi.lb in Lawrence, 
Massachus.etts;, remaining until February, 1861, when he re,sign1:;d to serve 
the cause of the Union. 
The Civil War offered Fox the greatest opportunity of his career. 
In February of 1861, when it became obvi.ous that Fort Sumter was in 
grave danger, Montgomery Blair urg~d ~nny conunander-in-chief Winfield 
Scott to consult Fox on the matter of relieving the fort". From this 
time on,. Fox was -·to play an important role in the affairs of" the Civil 
War. 
After the failure'of his expedition to Fort Sumter in April, Fox 
conveyed to the Cabinet and to the President, the opinion that the diver-
sion of his capital ship, the.Powhatan, had made both him and 'the expedi-
ti9n look ridiculou,. Because he felt he owed some.thing to Fox for his 
effort at Fort Sumter and because he had always been impressed with the 
man, Lincoln asked Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles to give Fox a job 
-.l ,, ' •• ' 
in the Navy Department. 8 Welles~ realizing that Fox Os effor,ts had })e_en 
largely nullified by the Powhatan, affair, acceded to Lincoln°s request 
and appointed him to the position of Chief Clerk in the Navy Department 
on May 8, 1861. 
The appointment of Fox to the Navy Department was a fortunate deci-
sion. Eighteen formative years of Fox 0s life had been spent-- in tb.e navy, 
.,,. 
and i1t1. addition to knowing many naval people, he was well informed on 
8charles McC~rtney, Mr. :Cincoln°s Admirah9 (New York: Funk and Wag-. 
nalls Co. , 19-56) , 15. Heruf ter cited as McCartney, Mr.~ Lincoln I s . 
Admirals. ·· -
6 
technical matters. Bis experience as mill superintendent in Lawrence 
gave him a knowledge of business affairs that also fitted him very well 
for the heavy r~sponsibilities he was about to assume. Among his busi-
ness acquaintances were many prominent merchants and shipmasters of 
New York and Boston. The community of merchants by whom the Navy Depart-
' 
ment was now cajoled, now condemned, was clamoring for naval ships to 
protect their harbors and to scour .~he seven seas to warn their vessels 
not to risk comfiscation in Confederate ports. As a measure of reassur-
ance to the politically important shipping interests in New England, 
Fox 0s appointment proved to be a master stroke by Lincoln. 
' 
Af~er Fox had. served for one month as Chief Clerk, Secretary Welles 
realized he would be invaluable as a close aid to him in the Department. 
There was a feeHngin. t~e a4minist:ration that a man. w;i.th actµal experi-
i:~. 
~nee on ships was badly needed.in the Navy Department. According~y, on 
August 1, Wel.les pushed a bill through Congress creating for Fox the 
. . . 
office of Assistant Secretary. Immediately a~ter the bill pass,ed, Lin-
., 
coln a~pointed Fox to' the· new.post. With Welles ae Secretary and Fox 
as Assistant. Seci:etary, t,he Navy Departpient wa8: blesfsed with a rare 
combination.of talents. Wells provided an in~imate knowledge of politi-
cal matters, a strong but unobtrusive personality, a readinese to accept 
' . . ~ ' 
advice '.from competent, sources,. and took upon hi~elf the control of 
' . 
legislative concerns and worthily represented the aavy in.the Cabinet 
and to the nation. .Ff?X, under the direction of Welles, regulated, 
planned, and handled those things which were purely naval or military 
in their structure. Seldom has their beeD a finer instance of "team-
work" in Washington. 
CHAPTER II 
TilJ: FORT SUMTER EXPEDITION 
Late Marcll of 1861 found the North and South rapidly drifting close 
I 
to Civil War. After Sou~h Carolina had seceded in December of 1860, 
Presiaent James Buchanan backed ·away from de'.fending federal forts in the 
• I I I 
Southern states. At the time of Lincob». 0 s inauguration, all the· for.ts 
I : . . 
and naval yards in the seceded states, excepting Fort Pic,ken~ and Fort 
I 
~umter,. fell without resisting to the Confederates. The South ma4e it· 
\' ' . , 
clea,r 'to Li~coln that the. ,jurisdiction o,ver these fort;.s had pi&s~ed to 
'them upon their secession from the Union and tha:t their retention by the 
' ' 
federal government was equivalent to, an act of war. 
1" ' • 
Yet, for a'mont~ 
' . . 
a,fter ,his inau~ration the President f9llowed Buchanan's policy. 
• • ' • J 
Major Robert Anderson in c~mma.nd at Fort Sumtef had notified the 
.. I 
War. Department <?IA March l's that bis supplies were running out aQ.d that 
the ga~ris-~n would have to be provisioned if he was expected to hold 'the 
) 
.. . ·. - . ·. 
fort. Lincoln,was now faced; with an i'l,llPossible situation. If he tried 
to provi~~on or reinforce Fort Sumter, it would undoubtedly mean civil 
I 
' , , ,, . . • , , I 
· war; if, to avoid a conflict, he allowed Fort Sumt,er to fall' into Con-
.· . i; ' ·. ' . 
federate hands without a fight, ~he principle of the Unipn would b.a fatally 
co'1Prpmised. Cquld a re,cogni tion o.f . the Confederacy th.ereaiter .. be 
I \ ! ' 
,avoi4ed? The South had the aqvantage of time; it was up to Li~coln to 
! ) ' l I •1 ' 
dec!ide which path 'the North would. fol,low •. 
,, I ' 
The Presidemt delayed, action on the crit;i.cal ·subject pf rein-
· forcing the federal forts after his inauguration·, ~ot so much because 
7 
8 
he did not know what to do, but because he was w~tching Virginia. 9 The 
. .I•, 
·., .. 
old state was worth waiting for; her sons were the ablest officers in 
.. 
the U~ited States ··Army, and her soil was certain to be the theatre ,of 
any war betw~en the states. Lincoln also knew that if Virgini.$ seceded, 
. ~ . ' 
North Carolin.a, Maryl~d, Kentucky,Tennessee, Miss?uri, and AJ;kansas 
were likely to follow. He closely watched the Virginia Convention that 
met in February and March, attempting to.· gauge the path they would take. 
Tw:,ice Lincoln offered to yield Fort Sumter to _the South if ~he Virginians 
would break up their conventio~ and back'the Union.lo When they re-
fused, Lincoln knew for the first time that Virginia would join the Con-
federacy regardless of his policy. 
The situation in late March remai~ed very critical, ·and as the 
tension rose higher and higher, the nmne of <,;uistavus v •. Fox became in-
... 
crea~ingly iiuportl!nt. It was ?oxus :J>lan for the relief of Fort Sumter 
7 that would be the ~irect, immediate spark to set off the Civil War. 
I, '\ 
, 
Lin.coln, to be sure, made his own decision to reinforce the fort, but 
it was Fox who convinced him that_ th~ .Plan could be carried out success-
fully •. When Lincoln be.came convinced that this could be do:ne ne .gained 
the confidence needed to force the South into a showdown. instead, of more 
of the wattiug and inaction of the month before which had destroyed much 
. -
of the confidence in the North and deeply tried the Union°s patience. ' 
It. was through Montgomery Blair 0s inf°luence with Winfield Scott and 
Lincoln that Fox was given the opportunity of pres·enting. his plan. Re 
9Roy-P. Basler, (e,d.), The Collected Works of Abraham LiJ!l,coln, (9 
vols., New Brunswick, New Jerny: Rutge,;.s University Press, 1953 ... 55), IV, 
282, 289. I, ' 
w . . .·. John T. Morse, Jr.,. (.eli.), .!!!! Diary!! Guleon Welles, (4 vols., 
Bosto~: ~d New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.; ,19Jl), I, 6. Hereafter cited 
., , as Morse, Jr. , (Ed.) , Diary .£!. Gideon .Welles; . , , 
9 
watched with uwunt:btg frustration the growing danger of .losing Fort 
Sum~eir during the ea':rly pa.rt of 1861. He h&d recently been appointed 
. ' . 
Postmaster General under Lincoln, and this position, plus a famous 
family name and backgr.ound, gave him enough prestige to be held in high 
regard. 
On February 2, Blair advised Genera~ Scott to donsult,Fox on how 
best to px:ovision and reinforce Fort Sumter in view of the in~reasing 
danger that was confronting the fort. 1 Scott did.this, and two days 
later the AHbtant Secretary brought his plan for reinforcing Sumter 
to President 111:11,ich~nan. Scott told Buchanan that he deemed the, plan 
feasible, but the President was apprehensive about reinforcing the fort 
2 no matter how good the chances were. · Buchanan told Fox that the Star 
of the West expedition had convinced him that fort Sumter would be ex-
--~ ·'. 
tremely hard to reinforce. 3 To this Fox ,replied that he believed 
that; expedition might have succeeded if it had held determinedl~ to 
its cour~e and ignored the ineffective fire from the .Confederate 
.. 
4 
.batteries at Charleston. Knowing now that Buc1J,anan waiil openly skep-
tic.al of any plan to reinforce Fort Sumter, Fox nevertheleH presented 
/-M~cartney, !!! . Lincoln us Ailmif&J.b, 15. 
12David D. Porter, Naval History of !'!!! Civil. war, (New York: Sher-
man Publishing Co., 1886), 96. Here,i.fter cited as Porter, Nava.l'Ristory 
of the Civil War. 
Btbid. (The Star of the West was under the co1llllland of Captain 
William McGowen of ~Revenue Marine, and on January 5, 1861, was 
supposed to carry provisions to the battered fort. Upon entering the 
harbor and getting within range of the guns on Morris Island, she re-
ceived fire, and it was obvious the ship would be sunk if she c~ntinued 
toward Fort Sumter. McGowen, re~lizing this, turned back. 
4aichard J. West, Mr. Lincoln°s !!!;l, (New York: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1957), 18. Hereafter cited as West,~· Lincoln°s ~· 
10 
his pb.n. 
Fox knew that all the channels going into Charleston were obstruc-
ed, but since some were four miles in width, they were too extensive to 
be complet~ly closed. Tb.e,.bar around Charleston was only seven feet 
deep, too shallow for the passage of steamers capable of bearing a very 
offensive punch •.. Using this premise, Fox concluded that the South 
would expect light steamers in any attempt to reinforce the fort. 
Rather thml!. play into Southern hands by using these tactics, Fox planned 
to use the Star of the West (a large, comfort~ble sea steamer) and hire 
'~ - - -=---:--
two powerful light tugboats to carry the needed supplies. After,arriving 
at Charleston, Fox 0s vessel would anchor off the bar and he would examine 
Southern naval preparations. If Southern.vessels opposed the entrance 
to the bar, which would be at night, the armed ships, with help from the 
fort, would destroy them. Having dispersed this force, the two tugs, 
·with one half of the troops on each, would relieve Sumter. 
Buchanan never serioµsly con$idered Fox 0s plan, even though he 
thought it to be commendable. He was content to serve out his term 
without acting and on March 4 ha~ded the problem of Fort Sumter to 
Lincoln. 5\ His final orders to Anderson at the fort was· that the Major 
should not prevent the South from erecting earth works within reaso~able 
bounds while he held Fort Sumter as long as possible without precipating 
hostilities. Tb.is would seem to indicate that Buchanan wanted no 
trouble. After Jefferson Davis was elected President of the Confederacy 
on February 5, Fox was told by Scott that Fort Sumter probably would 
not be reinforced~ The failure of the~ of~~. expedition and 
fear that Buchall).an would start a civil war if he attempted reimforcement 
rPorter, Naval History of the Civil .!'.!!!,, 96. 
11 
., 
of Fort Sumter were the factOX$ that influenced the President's final 
decision not to reinforce the fort~j 
The situation from early February through the middle of March re-
mained one of stalemate between North and South. The South realized 
that all the pressure was on Lincoln and the North to make the first 
move, and they wisely, played a waiting game. No more was heard about 
Fox's proposed plan to reinforce Fort Sumter until March 12, when he 
' 
received a telegram from Montgomery Blair, telling him to proceed to 
Washington immediately to. present his plan for reinforcing Fort Sumter 
to Lincoln. Blair, at least during the first four months of Lincoll!!l.~s 
administration, had more influence with him than any other man in the 
Cabinet. 7 ·· He was the one man in the Cabinet who thought that ·Fort 
Sumter should be maintained by the North, offering to resign if such an 
attempt were not made. As Blair saw confidence~.and:•l9yaltyl•cb::9pi.in:bhe 
North due to inactivity on the part of the government, he became con-
vineed that at least an attempt should be made to provision the fort, 
if only to raise the morale of the Union. On March ll Blair repeated 
~o, Lincoln his fc:aars regarding Fort Sumter and mentioned to him that 
his broth,er-in-law, GustaVt1s Fox, a smart, experienced, former navy man 
had propesed a plan for rein.forcing the fort in Februa;:i;:y, to President 
Buchanan, a scheme that had been deemed feasible even by ultta conserva-
tive Winfield Scott. 8 Lincoln told Blair that'he would iike to hear 
Fox 0s plan at"once. 
Two days·later.Fox a.rriv:ed in.Was1'ingtcib. and submitted his plan to 
", ' 
'6 ' 
· Porter~ Naval Blstory .!! £!!!Civil~' 96. 
7
~illiam E. Sm'ith, The Francis Pre$ton Blair Family i! ~olitics, 
(2 vols., New Yo.rk: The MacMillian .c;o., 1933), II, 92. · · · · 
,. ( 
.Spotter, Naval _History 2£. the Civil !!!:,,· 96·. 
12 
President Lincoln. Fox told Lincoln that although all the channels 
over the bar at Charleston were obstructed, the bar was too wide to be 
completely closed. He reasoned that at high water and _smooth sea, the 
bar would be accessible to vessels drawing only seven feet of water. 
,'.'.'· 
The North had no steamers of this type, so the success of the plan 
would have to depend on small boats reli~ving the fort under cover of 
da.rkneH at high ·tide and under calm .seas. 
Having given Lincoln a good picture of the Southern defense, the 
former navy officer now turned to the heart of his plan, which included 
the ships and men necessary to tMke it a success. Fox's plan called for 
one large passenger liner to carry the needed troops.and stores; several 
small gunboats to move into the mouth of the harbor to fight off enemy 
naval craft; and one large war veHel to supply a group of small boats 
with seamen when the .supplies and troop reinforcements were to be run 
9 into Fort Sumter. If Southern vessels attempted to oppose the en-
trance of the. relief boats (a feilllt or flag of truce would find this out), 
Fo.x would send the armed ships cloi!e to the bar, and in unison with Major 
Anderson from the fort, would open fire on any vessels within range an.d 
would destroy naval fortifications, while preventing any naval succor 
from being sent down from the city. With surface opposition knocked out, 
Foxus small boats, on a full tide at night, would race for! the fort. 
Fox realized that Confederate land batteries around the harbor would sink 
a few boats, but was confident that enough of them would get through. 
Lincoln was impreSJSed by the Fox plan because of iU practical nature 
and also becau1e he was .. fast coming to the conclusion that his conciliatory 
9 ' ' 
· Robert Thompson and Richard Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Cor-
respondence£! Gusta·vus .!!!! Fox, 1861-1865, (2 vols., New York: De'fint'lle 
Press, 1920), I, 19. Hereafter ci"ted as Thomson and Wainwright, (:eds.), 
Confidential Corre$pcn~ence of!!•!• Fox. 
13 
efforts tow~rd the South to keep Virginia and the border states in the 
Union were pr~ving fruitles@ and that something would have to be done 
on~ way or the other soon. Even so, he wanted to hear other opinions 
on Fox 0s plan, knowing that his knowledge of naval and military matters 
was meager. 
On Mar~h 1, even before Fox 0 s plan had been submitted or known 
about,Lincoln asked all of his Cabinet members to give their opinions 
on this qu.estiong "Assuming it. to be po1Hible to now provision Fort 
10 Sumter, unde; .all the circum!iltances would it be wise to attempt it?'' 
With the exception of Montgomery Blair, who thought an attempt.at rein-
forcement, even if it failed, was better than doing nothing, the Cabinet 
was unanimous in agreeing that Fort Sumter should be left to the Confeder-
! 
ates to avert Civil War. ,Sec;r~~ary of War Cameron° s view was typical of 
the majority of the.Cabinet, who thought Sumter should be abandoned. 
Cameron told Lincoln that Fort Sumter could have been reinforced easily 
when Ander$on first lJl()Ved in, but now, due to Fort. Moultrie being 
I 
strengthened and new land batteries having been_constructed, 11 ••• the 
difficulty of reinforcing the fort has increased twenty fold. 11 U. Camer-
on then vetoed Fox 0 s plan because he thought the Union ceuld never pro-
vision the fort, much less hold it, and even if Sumter were reinforced, 
it would touc~ off a Civil War. He favored evacuation, the sooner the 
_better. 
Commander-in-chief Winfield Scott ·expressed the view of the over-
10 West, ~· LincoLnhi ~s 17. 
11The War of the Rebelliong A Compilatiqn of the Official Records 
of the UuionandConfederate ·Armies, (70 vols~ ,128 books in the U • .S. 
ierial set; Washington~ Gove_rmnentPrintin.g Office, 1880-1901), i, I, 197. 
Hereafter cited as Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 
(Series cited in sm.9:ll case roman numeral; volume-rii' large case). 
14 
whelming majority of the mil:l.tary chiefst. Scott told Lincoln that two 
months earlier, in January, he had advised President Buchanan to re:t.n-
• I • .:. . 
force Fo;t $umter because he then thought a skeleton garrison could hold 
. . 
it. Now, because of increased Confederate forts and guns, he did not 
. . . . . ' 
think the plan was feasible. Bis final advice to Lincoln was that for 
purposes of military importance Fort Sumter was not vital and from a 
military viewpoint it could not be reinforced successfully)2. 
Seeking to get a truer pictur~ of the situation at Fort Sumter be~. 
fore makimg a final decision, Lincoln, on March 19, sent Fox to Charles-
ton to consult with Anderson and to see first hand the conditions around 
and in the fort and to observe Confederate military preparation. In a 
letter to his wife dated the day he left, Fox said, "Abe Lincoln has 
taken a high esteem. for me and wishes me to take dispatches to Major 
Anderson with regard to its final evacuation and to obtain a clearer 
I 
statement of his condition ~hich his letters, probably guarded, do not 
exhibit.n13 Fox also told his wife in the letter net:-.te speak of the 
mission because it was not to be made public to avoid arousing any hopes 
or fears in the North. 
Fox, arriving by way of Richmond and Wilmin~ton, got into Charles-
ton on March 21 and was met by Lieutenant Richard Hartstene of the Con-
federacy who took him to Governor Francis Pickens of South Carolina. 
Pickens consented to let him speak with. Ander·son. Ha.rtstene took Fox to 
se.e the Fort Sumter commander after dark for a conversation that lasted 
for two hours. Once in the fort, Fox found th.atLA1lldersiplli1·s·hmenI:ihad been \i . . " .. 
working feverishly to ready it against attac~. The Major was very·pessi-
mistic about the chances of rei~forcing the fort. He tol~ Fox that the 
UPorter, Naval History of~ Civil War, 96. 
I i . . .. ,
13Thompson and Wainwright (eds.), Confidential Correspondence of 
~- !• ~, I, 10. 1 . -
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only way Smnter could be successfully reinforced would be to l&nd an 
army on Morris Island off Charleston harbor, and that even this measure 
would probably be too late. Anderson felt that entrance to the fort by 
sea was an impossibility at this late date, and mentioned to Fox that 
his provisions would be exhausted by AprU 15. Sa.id the Sumter c~mman-
der about Fox 0 ai proposed expedition: "I confess that I would not be 
wUling to risk my reputation in an attempt to throw reinforcem~nts into 
this harbor within the time for our relief a.n.d with a view of holding 
the fort, without a force of 20,000 well disciplined men."14 
While talking to Anderson in the dark (the Confederates would let 
Fox visit. Anderson only under this condition) a freak event gave Fox 
an important idea on how to better his plan for reinforcing the fort. 
While listening to Anderson°s reply to one of his questions, Fox heard 
the sound of oars and realized that, although very near the fort, a. boat 
had come i~ unseen and unheard, until it was about 100 yards away. Tb.is 
gave Fox the idea of supplying the fort with small boats at night. 15 As 
the conversation came to a close Anderson told Fox that if he put his 
men on half rations~ he could hold out ~ntil April 15. What Fox did not 
know was that Anderson had no intention of doing this unless so ordered 
by Washington. Fox had taken for granted that the Major would do this 
inunediately on his own.16 Fox wisely DUll.de no arrangement with Anderson 
for supplying or reinforcing the f~rto After pidding Anderson goodby 
and wishing him good luck, Fox immediately returned to Washington. 
Upon his arrival in Washington, Fox immediately reported to Lincoln 
l4official Records of!!:! Union!!!_ Confederate Armies, i, I, 197. 
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on hi$ visit with Anderson at the fort. He was very optimistic about 
the chances for :success in relieving Fort_Sumter. He told Lincoln that 
the morale of A.ndersonrs men was high and that he was sure he could get 
by the Southern_ sho.re batteries and naval vessels to reinforce the fort. 
Fox, however, played down the fact that Anderson was not anxious for an 
attempted relief of the fort, and in fact; had. been. ~ery pessimistic 
The only change that Fox·advoca-
.. ~ ' ' 
ted IDfl'king in his original plan as a result of the visit, would be to 
supply the fort with small, quiet boats. 
During the last week of March, Fox s.ppeared before Lincoln, Cabinet 
. ,-
members, and military leaders to answer questions relating to his plan. 
Lincoln still wavere~ on the question ~f reinforcing Fort Sumter and 
desired other opinions on the proposed plan other than Foxus. To this 
Fox xeplied th~t, bec&use the expedition was a naval plan, he felt that 
naval men should be asked to, approve it. Lincoln agreed to this and 
asked Fox to produce two high ranking naval officers to defend his plan. 
On March 23 Connnodore Silas Stringham (head ot detailing in the Navy 
' ' ·- . ! ' 
·- I' 
Department) and Commodore Charles Stewart (the officer under whom Fox 
served on the Washington) gave support to Fox 0 s plan in a conference 
with Lincoln. They told him that passing batteries with light boats at 
night at right angles to the enemy 0 s line of fire, at 1,300 ye.rdsdisl-
tant, was not especially dangerous and had been done many times during 
the Crimean War. 17 They also mentioned to the President that steam-
ships had been. known to pa.Sls within 100 yards of a fort at raight without 
being seen. 
Despite these assurances, all the Cabinet members, excepting Blair, 
17Boynton, History of the Na.YI During tb.e Rebellion~ I, 246. 
18 
(and' sometimes Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, who changed 
his views on the subject often) remained firmly against the plan, not 
~o much because it might fail, but because it might precipitate a civil 
W&i. General Winfield Scott and the military heads also opposed the 
plan, largely because of friction J.,etween the Navy Dep~rtment an~ the 
military. Scott argued that even if the fort was reinforced on.ce,.the 
problem would st:Ul come up again and again,18 
After hearing all the arguments on the proposed expedition, Lincoln 
on March 28 sent his former law partner Ward Hill Lamon to Charleston to 
reassure Govel'l'l.or Pickens that Fort Sumter would not be reinforced and 
that Major Anderson would be transferred to another post in the near 
future. Then suddenly, on March 29, for reasons unknown, Lincoln changed 
his mind and told Fox to ready an expedition to relieve Fort Sumter. On 
the first of the n~w month Lincoln received a letter from Allldersen and 
with it, a jolt. The Major revealed in the letter that he was exp.ecting 
orders to vacate Fort Sumter as Lamon had indicated, and that his food 
supply was very low. Wrote Anderson~ 11 1 told Fox that if I placed the 
command on short allowance I could make provisions last until the 10th 
of this month, but as I have received no ini!ltructionsi. from the State 
D.ep~rtmiexJiJ: that it is desirable to do $0 it b.u not been done. 1119 
fl 
Lincoln was stunned upon reading this report and immediately notified 
Anderson of Fox 0 s plan of relief. He told the commander that Foxes pro-
posed plan. called for m att,e~-t tC!ll _ proyi1ion Fort-- Sumter :and tthat' 
only in case the attempt were ~esisted would he try to reinforce the fort. 
Had Lincoln allowed the expedition to leave shortly after March 29, 
18Forter ~ Ma.val History of !!!! Civil !!!!, 97. 
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there still would have been plenty of time available to relieve Sumter 
before .Ander®onrrs supplies giB!.ve out. However, during the next five days 
Lincoln hesitated, and with this emsuing delay the chances·· for a success-
ful expedition were greatly reduced. Meanwhile, Fox acted immediately 
after he was given the order to ready an expedition, and by April 2 he 
was ready to set out for Charleston harbor. To hi$ chagrin and disgust 
this was not to be the case; he WiB!.S delayed five more days before he 
could leave. 
The delay® encountered by Fox were largely the result of the Union 
governmentrrs trying to avoid war. Lincoln was still watching with vital 
interest the Virginia Convention. The Pre~ident was in a dilemma; he 
was in danger of doing the wrong thing no matter which way he decided 
the Sumter que®tion. If the Confederacy could get a peaceful evacuation 
of the fort» they could claim it a$ an acknowledgement of their rights 
and virtually of their independence. On the other hand, if they could 
provoke the governmen.t: into attacking them at Fort Sumter, they could 
capture the fort in self defe~se; and Europe (which would be so vital in 
case of war)» a~ David D. Porter indicated~ would say, 1tshame on a govern-
ment that tries to crush a weaker and independent people, merely wishing 
to govern themselves. 11 20 The Cabinet, excepting Blair and the military, 
still hoping to ~v@id Fox 1 s proposed reinforcement of the fort, used 
their influence on Lincoln to effect more delays in the early d~ys of 
April. 
Fox saw with every passing hour the chances for a successful expedi-
tion fade away. He realized now that Anderson could hold out only until 
April 15. He also knew that when he was given orders by Lincoln to start 
2
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. the expedition, it would take him at least three days to ready it and 
another five or six days to get from New York to Charleston by boat. 
The danger now was that he might not reach Charleston in time even if 
·orders for the expedition came immediately. ~d still he received no 
word from Lincoln. On April 3 Fo~ expressed his disgust to~ard the de-
laying of the expedition to his friend Dr. Samuel Lowery, remarking 
.that he had been r·eady since March 31, but that he now doubted if the 
expedition would ever get off~ 21 He commented that he had viewed with 
disgulSlt the delays, obstacles, indecision~ and politics which had held 
up his expedition and had increased heavily the odds against success-
' fully reinforcing the fort.22 Fox now thought that war would start at-
Pensacola, because there the government was taking a stand. 
While Fox wa~ working feverishly to get his expedition to Fort Sum-
ter underw~y, certa.in intriguing eventsi were taking place in the na,tionas 
capital that would have a direct bearing on the success or failure of 
his plan. In. a series of meetings from April l. to/Ap.ril 6, Sectetary of 
State William H. Seward and two <lllble, young officers, David D. Porter 
and Montgomery C. Meigs~ propoS!ed a plan to President Lincoln th.at was 
destined to be the direct cause of the failure of the Fox expedition to 
Fort Sumter. This scheme cal,led for the diversion of Fox 0 1 capital ship, 
the Powhatiem. Whether thit was a deliberate effort on their part will 
probably never be known, but their actions involving Fox 1 s plan were ex-
tremely significant. 
The four main ships to have been used in Fox 0 s expedition were the 
United States steamers Powhatan, Harriet Lane, Pawnee, and Pocahantas. 
~
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Of these four, the most.important was the Powhatan. The other three 
ships were to be used only for their fire power. The Powhatan was 
essential to the plan bec~use it had on its decks the 300,sailors who 
were to man the tugs and small boats to be used in the actual relief of 
Fort Sumter. 
Capt~in Meigs and Lieutenant Porter had early in 1861, considered 
Fort Pickens, Florida, of vital importance to the North because of its 
fine harbor, good naval yard, and strategic position that could be used 
as a base of operations against New Orleans and the coasts of Louisiana 
and Texas. 23 When Secretary Seward got wind of this plan he immediately 
brQught the two men to see Lincoln. 
On April 2, Porter ~nd Meigs, with Seward, met with Lincoln at the 
White House and told him of their plan. They deemed it too late to 
reinforce Sumter, and recommended instead the reinforcement of Fort Pie-
kens, which they considered of much g:i:eaur strategic value.· Lincoln 
immediately saw a correlation between their views and some expressed by 
Seward earlier and speculated if this was merely a coincidence. Briefly 
outlining their plan, Meigs and Porter proposed setting up a military 
government for Florida whose purpose it would be to reinforce and hold 
securely fQirts Taylor,.Pickens, and Jefferson. Seward agreed with this 
scheme, stating that he regarde~ forts Taylor and Jefferson off the 
Florida Keys as American Gibraltars, capable of controlling ocean traffic 
on the Gulf. 24 To Lincoln, this plan seemed very sound and a chance to 
~- restore lost confidence in the North, so he accepted it and decided to 
let Meigs and Porter reinforce Fort Pickens at Pensacolao 
23 Porter, Naval History .£! the Civil War, 94. 
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Lincoln, because he had not served in the navy, said he did not 
know how to write the necessary orders to the naval commanders involved· 
in the plan, so he allowed Porter and Meigs to draft the orders, which 
he then read. Porter now impressed upon Lincoln what was already pain-
fully true, that routine orders could not emanate from the Navy or War 
Departments without leaks, so honeycombed were the government depart-
ments with Southerners resigning or planning to resign. Thus he con-
vinced Lincoln of'the need to carry out these plans in complete secrecy.25 
Lincoln had not yet realized th~t one of the ships he had just 
ordered sent to Florida, the Powhatan, was already assigned to Fox 0s ex-
pedition; he even had it listed as such in private papers in his desk, 
but these he neglected to check. Captain An.drew Foote, head of the navy 
yard in New York, was in a state of confusion, having received one letter 
from Lincoln ordering him to fit out the Powhatan and acknowledge Por.ter 
as the new commander while "under no circumstances communicate to the 
Navy Departmen.t that she is fitting out," and mother from Gideon Welles 
also ordering him to fit out the Powhatan, while not designating any 
commander. 26 Since both orders required him to fit out the Powhatan 
for seaj Foote did just that. On April 5, however, Welles ordered Foote 
to assign the Powhatan to Captain Samuel Mercer for participation in the 
Fort Sumtef expedition. Foote now became suspicious of treachery and 
was in favor of telegraphing Secretary Welles to clear up the situation. 
Porter stopped him from doing this, emphasizing the President's demand 
for secrecy. 
Mercer and Porter conferred about the conflicting orders, and Mercer 
25wes t, !!_. Lincoln° s Navy, 22. 
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agreed to giv:e his ship to Porter, following the orders of the Presi-
dent rather than those of the Secretary of the Navy. On April 6, at 
23 
2:45 P.M., Porter left New York for Pensacola abroad the Powhatan des-
· pite Foote 0 s statement that he was expecting an important dispatch with-
in the hour. Just after Porter 0 s departure, (at 3:00 P.M.) Foote re-
ceived the me$Sage, signed by Seward, ordering Porter to give up the 
Pow~atan to Mercer. This change came because· Welles had learned of the 
diversion of the Powhatan through the replacement of his Bureau of 
&tail J.11ie®.d Cotnm(i)dore Stringham, by Captain Samuel Barron, unquestion-
27 
ably sympathetic to the South. When he learned of the diversion 
Welles flew into a rage and rushed to see Lincoln at the White House to 
demand an explanation from the President and S-ew.1.rd. Welles heatedly 
told Lincoln that he did not like to have interference, of which he 
knew nothing, in his department. Lincoln replied that he was sorry for 
the mistake, but that he had not known the Powhatan was to be used in 
the Fort Sumter ex;pedition. He then immediately ordered Seward to give 
up the ,owhatan to Mercer. 
Upon receiving Seward Os· messa.9;e, Foote sent a: Li:eut!eltlltn11..t.1,lfoenon a 
fast steamer to inform Porter of Seward 0 s orders •. Roe caught up to 
PoI"ter at 6:00 P.M. and relayed the orders. Porter decided to disobey 
Sewara 0 s commud bec1;1.use the Atl§!!:ritic (with Meigs and 600 troops abeard) 
was ten miles ahead and was dependent upon the Powhatan for all her 
artillery., The lou of the ship now would cause the plan to fail, and 
besides, his orders from the :President had been. explicit a>i!(d. took prece-
. I 
I .. 
dence over S_eward Os. Porter wrote to the Secretary of State, 11 1 have 
received my orders from the President and will·execute them.n28 With 
27Mors·e Jr .• , _(.ed.)$ Diary!!_Gideon Welles, I, 17. 
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After hearing delegates to the crucial Virginia Peace Convention 
tell him they would not abandon the conference despite his offer to pull 
out of.Fort Sumter, Lincoln became convinced that Virginia and the bor-
der states would join the South no matter how conciliatory his pblicy 
was. Thh, coupled with a rapidly diminishing confidence among people 
of the North, caused him to make his final decision regarding Fort Sum-
ter. On April 4 he told Fox to start the expedition to Charleston to 
relieve the fort. 
The question of leadership of the expedition was a sore spot to 
Lincoln. Many high ranking n~val men expressed a dhlike toward Lincoln 1 s 
choice of F.px as head of the expedition. They thought it was wrong and 
in bad taste to by-pass top naval commanders for a civi+ian to h~ad the 
expedition and to direct movement~ of n~val officers without authority 
of law, even if he had been in the n~vy before. This feeling on the 
part of cert~in naval, military, and civiliaYll heads produced pop;r co-., 
operation and hostility towards Fox 0 s plan. T~ese men thought that no 
naval commander familiar with the forms and precedents of the navy would 
or should submit quietly to this reflection upon this branch of the ser-
vice. Fox recognized this situation innnediately mll.d asked the Secretary 
of the Navy on April 4 to b.ave Co111Mdcire Stringham take command of the 
expedition. Stringham refused the order on the grounds that the expedi-
tion was too late to be successful and would likely ruin the reputation 
of the officer who t,tnde:rtook it.29 Thus Fox, a volunteer, with no 
official connection with the government, was placed in sole cha,:ge of 
29Porter~ Naval Hbtory ~~Civil~' 97. 
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all military and naval operations which might be deemed advisable. 
Fox r~alized th.at he had to act with great haste to retain even• 
slim chance of reaching Fort Sumter before Anderson°s supplies gave out; 
he thought he might already be too late. For his expedition, Fox needed 
a steam frigate (the Powhatan) to carry the 300 sailors to be landed if 
necessary, a full complement of armed launcpes, two smaller steamers, 
and three tugs. Without .the frigate arn.d the sailors and launches she 
-1 
was to ca3:'.ry, the sueces,fuL exec:ution of the plan would be impoHible. 
Fox had uine days in which to charter steamers, provide men and 
boats, employ tugs, and then travel 632 miles to his destination, an 
almost impossible task •. The hiring of the three tugs had been em.trusted 
to Russell Sturgis, a friend of Fox I s,: who )ilad ',great difficulty in pro-
. -· . . 
curing them, due to the dang~r of going to sea at that time. ~ox, on 
March 10, had made arrangements with George, Blount, William Aspinwall, 
and Charles Maxwell, N·ew York shipowners, to obtain the necessary vessels. 
Wb,en Sturgis tried to get the tugs owned by Maxwe~l, that elderly gentle-
man was apprehensive about loaning them because of the adaed· danger at 
this late date and also because of the influence of Secretary of State 
Seward. 30 Maxwell had been in Washington for two weeks before Sturgis 
came for the tugs and was in contact wtth Seward for much of that time. 
Fox believed that Seward advised Maxwell not to give up the tugs for use 
in the expedition. 
With the exception of the Powhatan, which.was being re~died at the 
New York naval ya:rds, tb,e three other steamers/ (Harriet.!!!!!,,_ Poca-. 
hantas, and_ Pawnee) :we.re in the watel' and when their conunanders received 
their orders immediately proceeded to Charleston harbor. Fox originally 
30Porte-r, Na.val History £! ~ Civil !!!_, 99. 
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asked for the Harriet Lane to be his capital ship, but when Welles 
showed a d~sire to use the Powhatan, he readily agreed to the change. 
Fox got into New York on April 5, chartered Aspinwall 0 s Baltic, and 
delivered confidential orders to H. L. Scott, aide to the commander-in-
chief of the New York naval yards and to D. D. Tompkins, quartermaster, 
ordering them to cause a detachment of 200 with enough guns, annnunition, 
and supplies, to be immediately organized. Colonel Scott r:l:9ficuled the 
idea of relieving Sumter, and by his indifference a crucial half day was 
lost. The recruits given to Fox were the rawest Scott could find, most 
of them having just entered the army. Having completed this job, Fox 
left for Charleston on April 8. 
Secretary Welles gave Samuel Mercer of the Powhatan command of the 
expedition and ordered him to leave New York.on that ship in time to be 
off Charleston Harbor, ten miles d~e east of the lighthouse, on the 
morning of April 11, and there to await the arrival of the other three 
sh,ips and all the transports. The same orders were received by J. P. 
Gillis (PaW11lee) at Norfolk, S. c. Rowan (Harriet Lane) at Norfolk, and 
Charles Faunc'e (Pocahantas) at New York, on April 5. They were ordered 
to report to Captain Mercer for special service and " ••• should he not 
be there you will await his arrival. "ll 
Secretary of War Caxneron gave Fox connnand of the complete expedition 
(Mercer was supposed to conjmand the ships, but remain under Fox) and his 
final orders were issued on April 4. Fox was to try to deliver the pro-
visions and if opposed, would report to Mercer, the senior n8;val officer 
off the harbor, who would f~rce an entrance to allow both troops and 
supplies to enter Fort Sumter.32 .All of the ships left for Charleston 
31Thompson and Wainwright, (:ads.), Confidential Correspondence of 
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harbor at different times. Fox states that the Powhat~n left on April 
6 (it did, but not for Charleston harbor)~ the Pawnee on April 9~ the 
Pocahant~s on April 10, the Harriet Lane on April 8, and the tugs on 
April 8. 
At 6:00 P.M. on April 8, the Baltic anchored off Sandy Hook, New 
Jersey. Fox was bothered at this time by the fact that he had not had 
a chance to speak with Welles about putting heavy howitzers on the man-
of=w~rs for use in knocking out naval preparations while the tugs got 
through and also for use in the tugs themselves in case they had to 
·, 
grapple with the enemy. At 8:00 A.M. of April 93 the pilot of the Bal-
tic was discharged and she was Charleston bound. 
Lincoln destroyed whatever secrecy Fox 0 s expedition had had when he 
insisted on informing Governor Pickens about the expedition. This he 
did through Robert Chew~ a State Department employee who read to.Pickens 
the message sent by the President. In effect, the message told Pickens 
that Fort, Sumter would be provisioned and if the attempt was not re-
sisted, no effort to reinforce the fort would be made without further 
notice. 23 
Sooltll after,leaving Sa1llldy Hook, the expedition en~ountered high winds 
and rough sea.s 9 which continued throughout most of the voyage to Charles-
ton. As a result 3 the Baltic, the fastest and best vessel in the ex-
pedition~ arrived on April 12, to meet the Harriet Lane, the only ve~sel 
that had arrived ahead of her. Fox was not aware of the fact that the 
Powhatan had been diverted to Pensacola; he also could not have known 
that the other vessels in his expedition were destined to arrive too 
late to be of any help to Fort Sumter. Thus, the expedition for which 
3
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he had worked so hard,' often practically alone, had failed before it 
even had a chance to test itself. 
When Fox arrived off Charleston harbor on board the Baltic at 3~00 
A.M. of April 12, he had two me~sagM that he had written during the 
voyage. The first was,iddressed to Governor Pickens. In this message, 
Fox told Pickens that the United States government had directed him to 
deliver a quantity of provisions to Major Anderson at the fort. (Due 
notice of this had been given earlier in a special message from Lincoln). 
Continued Fox 0 s message, " ••• accordingly,! send the first load. If one 
of your batteries open fire it will be upon an unarmed boat and unarmed 
man performing an act of duty and humanity •11 34 To Captain Jackson, who. 
would head the relief crew taking the provisions into the fort, Fox 0 s 
orders were explicit; he was told to take provisions and a letter to 
Major Ander&Son in t;he fort and immediately to return; if fired on while 
going in, he was to return at once.35 If anyone opposed his entrance, 
Jackson would give the letter addreSSJed to ·Governor Pickens to that per-
son and then return to the harbor. Uimder no circumstances was he to 
attempt to get through to po~t s~mter if opposed, 
The shelling of Fort Sumter began at 3~00 A.M. on April 12; at that 
time, of all the vesiaieb in Fox 0 s e:it:peditfon, only the Harriet Lane was 
anchored off Charleaiton har~or and ready for action. The Pawnee, because 
· ·.·. of high winds and seai.s i, arrived three hours late and the Pocahantas came 
in at 2:00 P.M •. on April 13, Ju:st illll time to watch For.t Sumter surrender. 
The fate of the three tugs was even worse; the Uncle~ had been driven 
into Wilmington by the violence of the gs.le and was captured by the 
34Thompson and Wainwright, {ei{hl.} 9 Confidential Correspondence of 
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Confe"deracy; the Yankee reached Charleston a few hours after Major 
Anderson°s troops left with the Baltic for New York; and the Freeborn 
had not been p~rmitted to leave New York. As to the whereabo~ts of 
the Powhatan, Fox knew nothing. :U: was not until 10:00 P.M. of April 
13 that he learned, through a note from Captain Mercer to Captain Rowan, 
dated April 7, that the Powhatanj carrying his 300 soldiers, howitzers, 
and fighting launches, had been diverted to Pensacola. 
i 
As soon as the PaWl!lee arrived 1 (at 6:00 A.M. on April 12) Fox 
boarded b.er and_asiked Commander Rowan to accompany him in to land pro-
visions at Fort Sumter. Rowan refused, replying stiffly that his ~rders 
were to await the Powhatan°s arrival ten miles off Charleston h~rbor and 
that he would do just this, not caring to start a civil war. '6:· Fox 
then used the revenue cutter Ha:rriet Lane as an escort and moved in :close 
to Fort SUllllter, where he saw with dhmay at 7~20 A.H.~, that the fort was 
" 
being bombarded but was replying gallantly. Fox learned later that the 
shelling of Sumter started at approximately 3g00 A.M. on April 12 after 
Major Anderson had refu$ed to surrell1!.der on that day but indicated that 
he would, with honor, when hi~ supplies ran out, two days hence. The 
South, however, had done just what Fox thought they would have to do. 
While en route from New York to Charleston, Fox reHJoned that the Southern 
spirit wanted a fight; the people in Charleston were getting dissatisfied 
with the Confederacy and were impatient for action. This is exactly 
what they got, and Fox 0s fears about the expedition being too late were 
now confirmed. 
After watching the bombardment of the fort for a short time, Fox 
36 . 
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The Oo~nder 0s attitude was now completely changed from his earlier 
refusal ·to go in, and he qffered to attempt to land provisions immedi-
ately. _ With such willingness expressed, Fox advised both the Pawnee 
and _ Ha.rriet ~ 1:to go · in close to the channel and anchor off the bar, 
which was done. The heavy seas and high winds had died down a little 
now and Fox wanted to attempt to land two boat loads of provisions that 
night. Because of the absence of the Powhatan and Pocahantas plus the 
sllort.age of hands and gun launches on the other two ships, he was over-
ruled by Commanders Rowan and Gillis.~7 The two commanders did agree 
' to escort. him in the ntext morning ·in defiance of the batteries even if 
the other two sliips did not show up. 
During the night of April u·the vessels stayed anchored in the 
channel waiting to meet the other two ships. Despite the heavy wind with 
an ensuing great swell an.d heavy fog, the Baltic, under Captain Fletcher, 
with Fox abroad, went ten miles out and signaled all night to show the 
still-expected i>owhatan where th.ey were. 38 While returning to the 
anchorage !llear daylight, Fletcher ran oa Rattlesnake Shoal but $Oen got 
off. The waves were so high in the early morning that the Baltic had 
to anchor four miles away from the war vessels and could not load the 
boats.· At 8:00 -A.M. Fox and Lieutenant Hudson (an army officer on t'b.e 
-I 
Baltic) went by sniall boat to the Pawnee, from which they saw blac~ smoke 
·po~ring from Sumter and the Southern batteries redoubling their fire. 
_ S·evere weather during the forenoon, prevented boats from being used to 
reinforce the fort, so ~owan captured an ice schooner and·offeredllt to 
37Thompson and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspondence of 
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Fox to carry in metn and provisicirns~ Fox accepted and " ••• on the night 
of the J3th I should, certainly have gone in and as certainly been 
knocked to piece~.u39 Fox now realized his cause to be hopeless. He 
.· . ·,, 
had just learned, by a note from Mercer to Rowan, of th~ Powhatan.9 s 
. - . '. 
diversion. This knowledge plus the rough seas and high winds- and the 
smoke pouring out of Fort Sumter, made a relief attempt impossible. 
. ~ 
One other curious incident served to hinder any chance of a relief ex-
pediti~n. On April 11 a number of merchant vessels bad come into Charles-
ton harbor and awaited tne result of the bombardment, wllicb led the South 
to believe that a large Union fleet waited off the harbor •. Tb.is caused 
the South to,strengthen their already formidable preparations for Fort 
Sumter. 
Fox was extremely bitte~ over the failure of his expedition cecause 
he felt that without outside interference and delays he could have 
succeeded~ To Fox the diversion of the Powhatan was the chief cause of 
. . 
the expedition's failure~ because this ship carried everything essential for 
lg.() 
success. , The weather also played a very important role, preventing 
the expedition from arriving on time and keeping the fort from being 
reinforc~d by the small .boats. Fox also listed the weakness of the fort 
itseti as contributing to the expedition 1 s failure. Re said the military 
people had told Lincoln that an expedition could not get into the fort, 
but that if it did the fort was impregmable. Actually, the fort was any-
thing but impregnable. The burning~£ the officers 1 quarters had ruined 
· .. 1 
the gorg~ wall, and in two more.:days it would have crumbled. One shot 
. 3~ . .. . .. . .. ' -
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went through the magazine, shattering the wall and preventing the opening 
of the door. Said Fox, "So thh impregnable fort with 33 guns and 17 
mortars, after 34 hours of fighting, had $400,000 damage and is burned 
badly. n41 The countles.s delays before the expedition was allowed to 
proceed caused inefficiency and hurried preparations, when actually a 
' ' 
plan of this magnitude and importa~ce should have had months of careful 
preparation. Fox was especially bitter towards Seward, whom he had 
always suspected of being against the expedition. To further hamper 
Fox 0 s chances for success, Lincoln had destroyed the secrecy of the plan 
by telling Pickens of the coming expedition. On Lincoln°s behalf, how-
ever, it must be said that all orders that had been issued by the Navy 
Department for some time had been telegraphed to Charleston within the 
f,. 
hour., 
Fox certainly was not to blame for the failure to reinforce Sumter, 
and po~sibly even the absence of the Powhatan had little to do with it. 
The real reason for the planve failure was the inaction of t~e govern-
ment, the disagreement between army and naval heads as to the feasibility 
of the plan, and the length of time elapsing between the period when Fox 
proposed the plan and the time when he was allowed to put it int~ operation, 
No one seemed desirous of helping him, and most of those whose business 
it was to get the expedition off on schedule threw obstacles in his way. 
On Stmday, April 14, at 2:00 F.M., under a flag of truce sent in by 
Captain Gillis, Fo~ offered a passage north to Amderson and his men. 
General P. T. Beauregard of the Confederate forces consented to this and 
allowed Anderson to salute the flag with fifty guns. The steamer Isabel 
took the troops outside the fort to the Baltic, which left t'/;mt evening 
41.rhompson and Wainwright, (eds;)~ Confidential Correspondence ,2! 
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directly for New York, arriving on the forenoon of April 18. When 
Anderson came aboard ship Fox praised the brave fight he and his men 
had put up and told him that Lincoln wanted South Carolina to appear 
before the civilized world as having fired the first shot.42 
33 
On the way home to New York, Aimderson exprened disgus.t toward the 
government for not informing him more about the expedition (when it was 
toward .Fox for not telling him everything he knew while at the fort on 
March 21. Amlderson told Fox that he should have made it clear to him 
whether the men were to be kept on half rations or not. When. Fox ex-
plaine4.that his hands had been tied and that he too had been duped and 
a victim of circumstances, Anderson apologized. 
F@x always felt certain afterward, that without interference from 
•, 
Seward and delays caused by Limcoln, his plan would have succeede_d. On 
April 19 he wrote a sarcastic letter to Lincoln in which he asked why 
the P~whatan, the one ship necessary for the successful execution of .. 
his plan, was diverted without any notification to him wh~tsoever. He 
remarked that somebodyas influence had ma.de the expedition look ridicu-
lous. Fox told Lincoln that all he had done was to witness tb.e bombard-
ment of the fort alone with none of his ships, depriv~4 by treachery of 
the power ~eeded to accomplish his purpose.43 He also said he had lost 
hi® reputation with the general public for the failure of the expedition, 
because he could not state the facts without injury to the government. 
Fox said a New York World correspondent had covered the action., and not 
knowing .. about the diversion of the p'q:irwhatan, would write very unfavorable 
42Thompson-and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspondence of 
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stories about the expedition.44 In a return letter one week later, 
Lincoln told Fox he was sorry the failure to provision .$wnter annoyed 
··- ,, 
him because thia wind and fog probably made it .. impossible anyway, but 
did admit ignoran.ce in sending the Powhatan .to Pemsacola. Lincoln. felt 
that Fox wasr ang1ryi·mos'tly because:_of:·, b,.is\-pf~pi~stigrti,te$~lting,Lft'om the 
. ,(:.-".~,;.: . . :.' ·.~~-. . . . . . . ' 
expedition.0 s failure. ·The President assured him that he was still held 
in high regard and that ~f another expedition were sent out, Fox again 
would head it. Said Lincoln., 11You·and I both anticipated that the cause 
. ' 
of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort 
_Sumter, even if it should fail, and it is not a small consolation now 
to feel our apticipation is justified by the result.,.4.5 
The one person Fox blamed most for the failure to relieve Sumter 
was Secretary of State Seward. Fox believed that it was Seward who was 
behind the plan to relieve Fort Pickens and that he had deliberately 
duped the uneTillspecting Lincoln into using the Powhatan :to stop., any 
attempted relief of Fort Sumter. He thought Seward did thi,s as a last 
resort to prevent the provisioning of For.t Sumter. According. to Fox,, 
Se.ward thought that if this could not be done, .Anderson would have to· 
surrender and war would be averted. Said Fox in a lette; t~. Montgomery 
Blair regarding Seward a1md the.Powhatan, H'fb.is order of the President' 
was unknown to the War or Navy Department and was signed by him in igno-
. : . . ' 
ranee that the Powhatan was one of my vesse,ls. She was sent off on an 
expedition got up by the Secretary of State who thus interfered with the 
other departments as the last hope of preventing the r,einforcement of 
44 rhompson and Wainwright v (feds.) , Confidential Cprrespon~ence £! 
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get it straight in justific.ation of myself and place a blow on the head 
of that timid (censored) W. H. Seward~ who paralyzes every movement 
from adjunct fear. 11 41 
In explaining why his plan failed, Fox said that Seward used all 
his power against it from the time it was proposed until its failure. 48 
Fox thought that Seward a.ho used hb influence to get G(!!ln~ral Scott 
and the military to oppose it. The Secretary of St.atews last trump was 
convincing Lincoln to send for Union delegates to the Virginia Peace 
Convention to tell them that Sumter would be evacuated if they would dis-
solve the Convent.ion. According to Fox~ by doing this, Seward delayed 
the expedition long enough to insure it$ failure. 
Fox believed the failure of the Powhatan to arrive in Charleston 
to be the chief reason for the failure of the expedition. This he be-
lieved in spite of the delays and interferences before April 5. With-
out it he had only the Pawnee and Harriet Laime with one twelve pound gun 
and 200 raw recruits who had never seen a gun of this type. They had 
been sent by Co'.J,.onel s,cott to further in!Slure failure. If the Powhatan. 
had arrived on schedule on April 12, Fo~ thought he would have got men 
and provbion.$ in because he had everything ready (boats, muffled oars, 
small packages of provision£}; everything, that h, except the 300 sailors 
1m,eeded to ma:n the boats used to proviSJion the fort. Fox believed that: 
even without the inen, a tug could have brought the provisions in, but with 
'46Thompson and Wainwright, (eds.}, Confidential Correspondemce of 
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Fox said that. Captain Rowan, Captain Gj.llh; and Captain-Foster of the 
Union Mavy and Lieutenant Harstene "of -~;e'\Coiif.edie#ite:'Navy au thought it 
. • ,. .. . • .:. 'I . . ~ 
could and would have supplied and rei~forced the fort. 49 Fox said that 
the fire from Fort -Sumter had knocked out Confederate naval preparations 
and had only left the batteries and light boats of the defense to illumi-
nate the channel., This would have made the task of the tugs much easier. 
Fox also had some angry words to say about the structure. of the fort, 
. which military men had told him was extremely strong. Tb.is proved not to 
be the case at all. Inside of thh·-ty-sii!ti<ih;oturi\ft:Jie,(£~.t!t,,was, Si.· :ba.ttered 
structure, on fire and with no hope of being reprovisioned. Fox felt 
that if the fort could have held out until the heavy seas had quieted 
down it could' have sun been reinfor.ced and prov1s1onec1. ;,,:it~-··t;1t tnat 
the true condition of the fort was of the utmost importance and should 
have beell'!. brought up by the military before the expedition left. The 
expedition, he reasoned, woµld have been. worthles.s even if it had rein-, 
forced a~d supplied Sumter, because the Confederates would have destroyed 
the fort completely within forty-eight hours. This would have made surren-
der inewftab lte. 
I,.'' 
Fox1 s plan for relieving and reinforcing Fort Sumter was not a 
fantastic idea; it was perfectly fe.1.sible and with any cooperation by 
the administration 3 would have succeeded., Whether or not Fort Sumter 
' 
could have been held after being re.in.forced does not concern Fox or his 
plan. His orders were tto supply, and if necessary, reinforce, the fort, 
l . 
. . 
and nothing else. Anything that happened after reinforcement was a 
/· 
49 !rhomp,son and Wainwright, (.eds.), Confidential Corre·spondence of 
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separate problem,. There is good reason to believe ,that influential men 
such as Seward, Winfield Scott, and Cameron, were against Fox 0 s plan 
not so much because they thought the fort could not be supplied, but be-
cause they feared a civil war might come out of the attempt. Commodores 
Stringham., and Stewa~t, two of the Union°s top naval strategists, be-
lieved supplies and reinforcements could have easily been taken to Sum-
' 
ter, as did Gideon Welles. Foxhimself'had put in many years in the navy 
' 
and was considered able in naval affairs. It seems incredible that if 
he were not certain of his plan, he would risk killing himself and_3po 
other men just for the effort. 
The chances for a successful supply and reinforcetp.ent of Fort Sumter 
had been very good; that is, they were good if a series of unexpected 
~ ,. 
developments had not occurred. If the expedition had gone off on 
schedule and according to plan without any interference or delays, it 
would almost certainly have succeeded. The plan could and should have 
worked out as ori~inally set up minus unforeseen interferences.and delays 
approximately as follows: Immediately after returning from his Fort 
Sumter conference with Major Anderson, Fox would have made all the arrange-
ments for ships, tugs, supp lies,, and men to be ready to go ey Ma;ch 29. 
By April 5 at the latest, all ships 9 men, and supplies would have been 
off Charleston harbor and on the following day the attempt to reinforce 
the-~ort would have been ude. If refused entrance, as he almost cer-
,, 
ta.inly would have been, Fox would have waited until darkness, and t~en 
reinforced and ·supplied the fort wi_th armed tugs, manned by exper~enced 
sailors and receiving protection from the guns of Fort Sumter, and the 
four big steamers. This did not happen, and as a result, the expedition 
failed. 
There are many views advanced as to why the expedition sent to Fort 
38 
Sumter failed, but the causes of failure fa.U into the following cate-
gories: 
(1) The Union government was unsure of itself and indecisive as 
to what to do about Fort Sumter and, as a result, delayed too long in 
sending the expedition. 
(2) Major Anderson knew nothing of the plan until April 4, when 
it was too.late to prepare adequately for it. 
(3) The delays of the expedition were caused by Seward 0 s influence 
on Lincoln, by Lincoln°s lack of confidence in himself during the early 
part of his administration, and by the President 0 s plan in regard to 
keeping the border states in the Union. 
(4} The Powhatan, the capital ship of Fox 0s expedition, which 
contained the supplies and men needed for a successful execution of his 
plan, was diverted to Pensacola by Secretary of State Seward. 
(5) The lack of cooperation between the different departments of 
the government hamp~red Fox from the time his plan ~as proposed until 
its eventual f~ilure. 
(6) High winds, fog~ and high seas caused the expedition to 
arrive late at Fort Sumter and made Fox 0 s task of reinforcing the fort 
impossible,-
(7) ?he lack of secrecy regarding Fox 0s plan and expedition was 
caused by governm~nt officials from the South deserting te the Confeder-
acy. Lincoln°s notification to Governor Pickens regarding Fox 0,i expedi-
tion was also a contributing factor. 
The firing on Fort Sumter by the South to stop the Fox expedition 
had important consequences, aside from starting the Civil War. The 
South n~w was see~ in the eyes of Europe as having fired the first shot 
in the North-South controversy; as a result, the Union could not be 
39 
accused of attempting to. bully a "free people" who were merely attempting 
to assert their independence. Tb.e spirit and patriotism of the North, 
which had reached a low ebb in early April,suddenly rose to fever pitch. 
after the incident at Sumter, and Lincoln had no trouble in getting the 
75,000 volunteers he called for. 
Fort Sumter was not relieved, not because the President did not de-
cide to do it, nor because there was any remissness in the Secretary of 
the Navy or any defect in Fox's plan, b~t because both orders and plans 
w~re secretly interf~red with in a manner that could neither be foreseen 
" nor avoided. ,Lincoln, however, was doubtlessly;rightin;pointing,out.,to 
Fox that the cause of the country h~d beeri advanced by making the attempt 
to provision the fort. The President knew that by attempting to provision 
Sumter, he placed the South in an impossible positi'on:. either they must 
resist the expe'ciition and start hostilities, or by letting Fox provision 
the fort, they would admit that they were not the sovereign nation they 
protessed to be •. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ATTACK ON NEW ORLEANS 
After the failure of his Fort Sumter expedition and his ensuing 
appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Fox soon became the 
navy 0 s best strategist in the planning of ~aval operations. The first 
Confederate stronghold Fox wanted taken was New Or.leans. 
At the start of the Civil War, New Orleans was to the North a city 
of unusual interest as keystone of the blockade in the Gulf of Mexico, 
gateway to the interior waterways of a continent, and the South's largest, 
richest, and most.cosmopolitan city. As the trading outlet in peacetime 
for over three thousand miles of navagible waters, she required wharves 
along the entire seven mile cresent of b,er levee to accommodate the 
hundreds of river steamboats and ocean going c~aft that.handled her 
~reight, lumber, grain, cattle, and hogs of the ~iddle West; turpentine, 
.; 
sugar, and cotton from the South. 
A strategic segment of the Confederate military plan at the start 
of the war was to close the Mississippi River to keep the ~orth from 
interfering with th~ shipment ~f supplies from Texas and the riveris 
countless tributaries to the Confederacy. When the war broke out in 
April, 18t>l, the South had effectively carried out this part of their 
plan; nothing from above could go below Cairo, Illinois an.d no vessel 
from the ocean could pass forts Jackson and St. Philip, near the mouth 
of the Mississippi. 
To Fox, ~n expert on naval affairs, an effective blockade of the 
40 
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mouth· of the Mbsissippi River to close th~ poirt of New- Orleans was not 
possible. The river had so many outlets and cha~nels of trade avail-
able that it would take a superhuman effort to close them all. One 
hundred m~les below New Orleans, Pass a L80utre 9 South Pass, and South-
west Pass were available for running in supplies; Lake Pontchartrain to 
the east and Barataria Bay to the west served the same purpose. Many 
secondary inlets, sprinkled around the Gulf Coast from Lake Ponchartrain 
to Atchafalaya Bay, (a 160 mil~ arc) caused more worries for the Union 
. ) 
By late November, 1861, Fox realized the time had come.for action 
by the navy; crops of the Midwest bad been harvested and piled up on 
wharves to await the opening of the Mississippi. The western pioneer 
had a restlessi1 temper,· and the Lincoln administration was painfully 
aware of this fact. The pol~tical and strategic necessity to free the 
river:for its usual traffic was imperative., By October the blockade on 
the e/l\Stern c?ast had been built up enough so that ships could be re-
leased for a thrust at New O:rle~ns. Fox ~as also aware. that John ·Sli-
dell, a representative of the Southern government, bad conferred with 
the English and French governments in Europe in May, and that both of 
. ) . 
these nations, especially the French, were ready to r_ecognize the Con-
1 federacy aw soon as their armies !ilhowed some military strength. The 
Assistant Secretary considered this a threat to the hopes for a reunited. 
! 
union and realized th.at the North would have to make a show of strength 
soon to _.dissuade French and British intervention. By mid summer of 1861 
Fox had.conceived of a plan designed to show the British and French the 
power of the JJn,io1111 na:vy. The plan was for the capture of New Orlea:ns. 
1A. T. Mahan, Admiral Farragut, (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 
1892), 175. · Hereafter- cited as Mab.an, Admiral Farragut. · 
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The former navy captain outlined his plan for the capture of the 
Crescent City to Secretary Welles during the sununer of 1861. Fox told 
Welles that if New Orleans was not captured, the great West would be 
excluded from all the lower river markets and from the Gulf, while from 
the Mississippi.River and all its tributaries below the Ohio the South 
was drawing unlimited supplies. The vast and fertile regions west of 
the Mississippi, especially Texas, were removed from the theatre of war 
and therefore produced supplies for the South asi if there were no war. 
Fox felt that a thrust through the South 0 s back door resulting in the 
' 
capture of New Orleans and the control of the Mississippi would be a 
terrible blow to the Confederacy because it would serve to block their 
main artery of conunerce. 
By the middle of Novemb~~' 1861, the Assistant Secretary, had his 
superior convinced of the possibilities of the plan, and Welles con-
sented to allow him to present it to President Lincoln. Fox was per-
sonally familiar with the Mississippi River, having traveled it many 
times while in the merchant service before the war. He was sure the 
forts t,and New Orleans ·C'.iould be taken by a strictly naval expedition, 
using ~he army only to occupy the city. Fox thought the a:rmy would only 
be in the way of, and would interfere with hi~ pla1!ll •. Throughout the 
war he remained jealous of all the credit the army received, while en-
gaged in operations with the navy. He felt that the navy, which had 
done all that was expected of her, and ,had a better record than the 
army, did not receive the credit she deserved. 2 
By November 7, the navy, blockad:i:~g the Atlantic coalst, had captured 
2'rh.omp$on and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspondence of 
G. V. Fox, I, 313-314. 
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Hatteras Island, Roanoke Island, and Port Royal, and Fox thought the 
time was ripe to start making preliminary preparations for the capture 
of New Orleans. After sounding out some military men on the feasili-
bility of such a plan, he was dismayed to find that few thought it had 
any chance of success. Despite this setback Fox felt that he had two 
factors in his favor: (1) The Confederacy felt almost entirely secure 
in their·defenses.below the city, which tended to make them overqon-
fident; (2) the Union had succeeded in diverting public attention to 
other points (Mobile, Galveston) as the probable objects of the next 
naval attack. 
Raving first ta~en the necessary but strictly preliminary step of 
seizing as a depot Ship Island, in Mississippi Sound (about one hundred 
miles from the mouth of the river), Fox submitted his plan, which had 
been accepted by Welles, to the President on November 12. The Presiden~ 
still held the Assistant Secretary in high regard, in spite of the ill-
fated Fort Sumter expedition of the previous April that had touched off 
the Civil War. Lincoln aiso recognized him as a professional man who 
had extensive acquaintance with ·naval officers and ships. 
'i 
Fox 0 s plan was dangerous, in that wooden ship' must ru, past two 
powerful forts t·o capture New Orleans; .he ba~ed it on two historical 
precedents.' The experiences of the Allied navies in the Crimean War 
convinced him that although the wooden sides of ships could not stand 
up against prolonged fights with forts, they were on the other hand cap-
able of enduring StJch battering as they might receiv,e in running by 
.. 
them through an.unobstructed channel.3 This thesis received support 
by the results of the attacks on Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal in the 
3
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summer and fall of 1861. Fox also remembered George Washington 8 s ad-
vice to the French admiral De Grasse during the Revolutionary War; he 
should send ships past Cornwallisu works to control the upper York River 
because land batteries had little effect on vessels passing with a 
breeze.4 
The Assistant Secretary therefore explained to.Lincoln that the 
delta passes and secondary entrances to Barataria Bay and Lake Ponchar-
train were so numerous that it was virtually impossible to blockade New 
Orleans from the outside. Instead, he suggested running past the forts 
as a means of capturing the city. After New Orleans had been captured, 
Fox said the isolated forts would be compelled to surrender. The army 
would only have to cooperate to the extent of loaning a few thousand 
troops to occupy the city. Fox told Lincoln that he would use swift 
steamers to ··:run past Fort St. Philip and Fort Jackson; after which he 
would capture and hold New Orleans until the army arrived. The Assis-
tant Secretary was frank to say that the plan was ve!y dangerous and 
daring but commented that the advantages to be gained in case of success 
were higher than the risk involved. After telling Lincoln that he was 
very optimistic about the plan, Fox left, leaving the President to an-
other momentous decision. 
Lincoln thought about Foxus plan for three days, and then decided 
that h~ did not know enough about military or naval operations to make 
a wise dechlion. Hence, on November 15, be called a very important 
secret conference at General George B. McClellan°s home, to which Mc-
Clellan, Welles, Fox, and Commander David D. Porter of the Powhatan 
episode were invited. The latter was held in high ~steem by Fox, and 
\\~;Mahan, Admiral Farragut, 118. 
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since he had made regular trips to New Orleans in command of a mail 
steamer before the war, his knowledge of the river to the city was con~ 
sidered invaluabl,e. 
Two army plans for the capture of New Orleans were brought up by 
McClellan.at the meeting. The oldest plan, talked of by military men 
w~en the war broke out consisted of taking New Orleans by a force des-
cending from above without naval cooperation. The navy would only have 
to be used to transport part of the army e~pedition up river. This 
proposed expedition had been under control of the War Department until 
it was shown that an iron clad fleet was essential to the reduction of 
river ports, at which time it was transferred to the Navy Department. 
. J • . 
Fox i~e~iately stat,d to the co~ttee assembled that this plan could 
not be worked successfully unless New Orleans and the forts were cap-
tured by a s~a assault. 
In the second plan, the military had backing from Secretary Welles 
and the_ President. The strategy '}?.resented by McClellan conceded· to, 
the navy that the best chance for a successful attack on New Orleans 
would be from the Gulf. However, the organizers of this plan thought 
that succeH ~c;,uld i:eiquire a large number of smaller, (~refer.ably iron-
clad) more powerfully armed gunboats than the navy had, along with 
approximately 50,000 men, and the conduct of sieges. McClellan stated 
.~ I I 
.that, after taking the two forts with slow advances, another slow and 
bloody movement would be necessary against secondary positions leading 
up to New Orlea~s, in which operation naval ships would enfilade the 
Confederate positions ahead of the troops. Fox was quick to point out 
the weak points of this plan in relation to his, explaining that hi, 
plan was quicker, less expensive, and contained the element of su~pri~e. 
' 
After listening to the military plans, Fox repeated his own for the 
46 
benefit of McClellan and Porter. Commander Porter told Fox that he 
thought the plan was a good one, but held that a mortar flotilla should 
first shell the forts before the steamers ran by and before troops 
occupied the city. Fox could not see why the operation had to be clut-
tered up by mortar schooners when fast steamers were able to run the 
forts. Porter explained that the mortars could eliminate the necessity 
for military operations ashore. Speaking especially for McClellanvs 
benefit now, Porter stated that a forty eight hour naval barrage using 
thirteen inch siege artillery on schooners would knock out enemy guns, 
permit the steamers to snap off Confed~rate supply lines, and hold New 
Orleans until the army could arrive. 
Fox·saw at the very beginning of the meeting ~hat McClellan really 
wanted: a military attack on Mobile first which would be the start of 
an all-out offensive against New Orleans. This type of plan, which would 
require thousands of men, was not possible right away; therefore Fox held 
out for an innnediate effective plan. McCleilan still labored under the 
illusion that 50,000 men would be needed to b,esiege the forts. He be-
,:. 
lieved that it was impossible for wooden ships to run by the forts, 
especially Fort Jackson which, with its tier of heavy coast guns, was 
' 5 
, the strongest mili,tary defense in the country. The 50,000 men McClel-
lan deemed necessary to take the forts could not be spared from.Virginia, 
and, it looked as if the plan wo1l:llld fail for lack of military cooperation. 
Porter and Fox now explained to the, "little colonel'' that 50,000 troops 
would not be needed; 10,000 would be sufficient to hold New Orleans • 
. The Assistant Secretary still could see no reason why a mortar 
bo~bardment was necessary, but to get the support of McClellan, he 
Saichard West, The.Second Ad~iral, (New York: Cow~rd-~cCann Inc., 
1937), 115-116. Hereafter cited as West, The Second Admiral. 
approved Porter's plan which McClellan liked. The enthusiasm of navy 
men for the Porter idea convinced him that even if th~ forts were not 
reduced, their gun crews would be demoraliz.ed and driven to ,shelter 
. . . 1 
long enough_fot the fleet to run by. Tnis factor, coupled with Fox's 
statement that only 10,000 men would be needed to occupy New Orleans, 
plus the 2,500 on Ship I~land, swung McClellan in favor ·qf the New 
Orleans plan. 
Lincoln now approved the plan, but because of Southern spies in the 
capital, decided to keep it a s,cret. Even the Secretary of War.was not. 
informed. Mobile, Pensacola, and Galveston were mentioned as possible 
destinations for the ~xpedition, and even,Charleston and Savannah were 
included. New Orleans was not mentioned. Lincoln and McClellan desig-
nated Major John G. Barnard of the engineer corps to help Porter adjust 
- . . ~ 
the details of the expedition. Barnard advocated_ not merely bombarding 
the. fort,s, but reducing them; this was added to the plan. In his ·words: 
"To pass those 1for,ts with, a fleet and appear before New Orleans is merely 
. " . . ' 
a·raid ana not a capture. New Orleans and the river cannot be held un-
til communications· are perfectly established."6 
The inability of the army and navy to work together, even after 
the plan was approved by President Linc~ln, held up its operatiQn. When 
the navy had ships the army did not have men, and vice versa. The 
sp_irit of distrust between the two branches was reflected in the first 
. . ' . 
joint operation of the war, Hatteras Inlet, and remained throughout.· 
. . 
Wrote Fox to Admiral Samuel DuPont, head of the. South Atlantic Block-
, I .. 
'~ 
ading Squadron~ '1We have a joke down here on the_ two_ la,te commanders of 
J.' 
the Hatteras. expedition, that after the fight they LAdmiral Silas 
:\~han, Admiral Farragut, 121-122 .• 
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Stringham and General B,njamin Butle!7 had a foot race North to see who 
should get there first and get the credit. 11? 
General Butler, a controversial. political general who had given Mc-
Clellan nothing but .trouble with his political influence and breaches 
of military etiquette, was given command of the army force to be used 
in the capture of New Orleans. Here McClellan saw a chance to get rid 
of Butler for a while by sending him to New England to recruit troops 
, for an expedition that might never get under way. Fox approved McClel-
lan°s appointment, but not without some misgivings. 
In late December of 1861, Welles, Fox, Porter, McClellan, and 
Lincoln agreed on the final plan for the capture of New Orleans. The 
plan used was Fox 0 s with Porter Os mortar bombardment incorporated intct 
it. The expedition would leave as quickly as po:ssible for Ship Island, 
where it would ready itself for movement to New Orleans; from there the 
flotilla would quickly enter the Miss,issippi River and prepare for action 
at Pilot Town. The treacherous channels up to the forts would then be 
surveyed and the mortar schooners placed in position for bombardment. 
The barrier of hulks and chains the Confederacy had thrown acro~s the 
river would be broken at the last minute and, as the expedit,ion ran pas.t 
the forts, mortar fire would double and redouble while th~;mortar 
schooners would move close to the forts and draw their fire. A dangerous 
plan this was, to be sure, but the high stakes to be gained if the ex-
pedition succee',ied, justified it. 
Now that the plan had definitely been decided upon, the big ques-
tion was, who would command the expedit:Lap,? The two best admirals in 
the Union Navy, Samuel DuPont and Andrew Foote, were serving in other 
7rhompson and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspondence .2!_ 
G. V. Fox, 1, 205. 
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key areas (DuPont headed the South Atlantic Blockade and Foote, the 
North Misiissippi Squadron in co-ordination with the army) and could 
not be spared. The first choice of Fox was Captain Porter, who despite 
his increase in r~nk was unable to head the expedition. Fox 0s second 
choice was Captain David Farragut. The Assistant Secretary had become 
interested in Farragut as a possible commander while searching for candi-
dates in the Navy Register with Secretary Welles .in early December of 
1861. Farragut also had a powerful friend in the navy in the person 
of Captain Porter, his foster brother.8 Porter was regarded as an 
able officer by Fox, and this undoubtedly influenced his selection. Al-
though Farragut was thirty-seventh on the list of.captains for promotion 
and had spent over one half of his naval career on shore duty, Fox was 
extremely impressed by the way in which he left Norfolk innnediately 
after the war broke out, even though his family and friends lived in 
that city. To Fox, ''This showed great superiority in character, clear 
perception of duty, .ai.n.d firm resolution in the performance of it/19 
Fox was not willing to trust his own limited judgment of Farragut's 
capabilities, so he asked the two hea,ds of the navy bureaus, Rear 
Admiral Joseph Smith and Re~r Admiral William Shubrick, plus Admiral 
. . 
Andrew Foote and Adxniral James Dahlgt:;en for their opinion on Captain 
Farragutus ability to lead a large campaign. against Mobile or some other 
point. They all rated him as a good officer, but since he had never 
conunanded a large force, doubted his ability to administer the affairs 
8charles Lewis, David GlaSJgow .Far:r::agut, .Q!:!!. First Admiral, (2 vols., 
Annapolisg United States Naval Institute, 1943), I, 18-19. Hereafter 
cited as Lewis,!• g_. Farragut. 
9Jim Dan Hill, Sea Dogs of the Sixties, (Minneap,olh: UDiversity 
of Minnesota Press, 1935)713.-. - -
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of a large squadron. When this same question was put to Porter he 
answered, "While Farragut is not a Nelson or a Collingwood, he is the 
best man of his rank. nlO Partly because he admired Farragut and had 
faith in Porter's judgment, and partly because no one else wa~ available, 
Fox, on December 15, had practically decided on Farragut for the com-
ma.nd of the New Orleans exped,ition. 
For such a daring plan, a man of unquestionable loyalty was needed; 
thus, even after his name had been .selected by Fox, Farragut came under 
close scrutiny by the Navy Department because some of his f~ily still 
lived in Norfolk. That he had left Norfolk immediately when war broke 
out could not be doubted, but could he be depended upon to exert·his ener-
gies to the utmos,t? To find the answer to this question and to avoid 
committing the Navy Department to something it wight regret, Fox sent 
Porter to New York on duty with the mortar flotilla with orders to check 
'' 
on Farragut 0 s loya,lty. Despite the fact that Farragut was his own fos-
ter brother, the Captain put him through a rigorous cross~examination; 
Farragut 1 s stated views showed him to be completely loyal. 
Now,. all that remained was to see if Farragut was .in favor of the 
military segment of the plan. Fex met the Captai~ at the train depot 
in Washington on December 21 upon his arrival from New York, and took 
him to the house of Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, where the three 
men breakfasted together and discussed the plan •. After breakfast, Fox 
laid before the Captain the plan of attack and the force to be employed, 
and asked his opinion of it. Farragut without hesitation .said it. would 
succeed. When Fox told him he would command the expedition, Farragut 
became wildly enthusiastic and said. it was the chance he had waited for 
lORichard West, Gideon Welles, 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1943), 168. 
Lincoln's !.!!I.. Department. 
Lb1eoln 1·s Navy Department, (New York:. 
Hereafter cit.ed as West, Gideon Welles, 
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all his life. 11 The Assistant Secretary gave him a list of vessels 
and asked if they were enough. Farragut said he could run by the forts 
and capture New Orleans with two thirds the number. This astounded Fox 
because all other naval connnanders had been crying for more ships eve.n 
when they had enough, but he told Farragut he would receive more ships 
anyway. 
Farragut thought very little of the military portion .of the plan 
L. . 
and said if he had b.een consulted earlier he would have advised against· 
the employment of the mor.tar flotilla. He had no faith in this mode of 
attack since his observations at San Juan de Ulloa twenty-three years 
before. 12 Farragut was convinced the fleet could run by the forts 
and anticipated nothing but delay from the bombardment; he suggested 
that horizontal fire from modern ordnance was better than mortar fire. 
Because the arrangements had already been ~de, howeverj he was willing 
to give the bombs a trial. As Farragut left the meeting he turned to 
Blair and Fox and said, "I.expect to pass the forts and restore New 
Orleans to the government or never return. I may not come back but the 
city will be ours. 11 13 After Farragut. left, Fox asked Blair if. he did 
not think the Captain was too rash and enthusiastic. Blair quieted 
these fears by telling Fox that this enthusiasm on the part ot Farragut 
was optimism a~d not boasting, and that he had been. favorably impressed 
with the man. 
On December 23, Farragut was directed to hold himself in readiness 
to take over command of the West Gulf Blockading. Squadron and the 
11:Ma.han, Admiral Farragut, 124. 
12Ibid. 
-
13tewis, ~.~.Farragut, Il, 13. 
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expedition to New Orleans. The utmost secrecy was observed, as is 
illustrated by this letter f~,m Farragut to his wife: "Keep your lips 
closed and burn my letters, for perfect silence is to be observed. I 
am to-have a flag in. the Gulf and the rest depends on myself. Keep 
,._;' 
calm: and quiet. I shall sail in three weeks. ,1.14 On January 9, 1862, 
Farragut received his official appointment to command the West Gulf 
Blockading Squadron, which was to operate from the mouth of the Rio 
\_ '. . 
Grande to the eastern shore of St. Andrew's Bay.in West Florida. 
David Porter, logically enough, was delegated by the Navy Department 
to lead tlle mortar flotilla and on November 15 Fox ,de_signated the Captain 
to go to New York to create this flotilla. Fox had made the arrangements 
for the mortars to be built in Pittsburgh. The rest of the flotilla he 
I• 1 
i 
',. ~ :.., 
had fitted -.out in New Yark, invo_lvin.g p~l:'chase of. schoone~s, carriages 
for the mortars, and a half dozen light draft steamers for tow~ng the· 
mortar scb.ooners :,upriver. Porter was ordered by Fox to examine and r.e-
port oa the naval vessels und.er construction at Philadelphia, ?few York, 
and.Hartford. This supervision by Porter served to hurry the construe-
tion of these vessels for the New Orleans campaign; on Febr:uary 3, all 
. . ~ 
the mortar s.chooners and steamers were finished, and Porter. left for 
Key west. 
On 3anuary 14, Fox was dismayed by an incident that threatened to 
destroy the whole plano On that.day Simon Cameton resigned as Secretary 
of War,.au~ Edward Stanton replaced him. The W~r Department previously 
had. not b~en told of the New Orleans plan becaus·e the Confederacy was 
often for~warned by spies in that department. The danger no~ was that 
14LQy~ll Farragut, (id.), ill!_ !!! Letters. of Admiral_ David Glasgow 
Farragut, (N$W _York: »~ Appleton a.ad Co., 1879), 208. · 
53 
Stanton would not approve of the plan. Fox had reason to .feel worried 
because General Butler, who was to cominand the military forces at New 
Orleans, was under fire from abolitionist Governor John A. Andrew of 
Massachuset.ts for corruption and malpractice in recruiting men from 
that state. Andrew.wanted the commissions given by Butler cancelled 
and that gentlemen removed from the army. Meanwhile, McC~ellan was 
only too eager to ~blige the Governor. By doing this he not only would 
rid himself of a problem general biut also would get out of participating 
in a plan that he considered doomed to failure. Fox appealed to Stanton 
at once, but the Secretary wanted to hear McClellan°s views on the sub-
'ject, and the ''little colonel11 recommended suspension of the expedition. 
The Assistant Secretary now worked feveri:shly with General Butler and 
General J. G. Barnard to justi·fy the "Q.avy 0 s plan of operation and to 
.show the significance of the plan. Stanton finally agreed to go through 
with the Assistant Secretary 0 s plan, and in so doing commenced a life-
time hostility with McClellan. 
Farragut left Hampton Roads on February 2 and sailed into Key West, 
Florida, nine days later to stock up on coal and supplies. On February 
20, the long voyage of Farragut 0 s flagship, the Hartford, came to an 
end with her arrival at. Ship bland. This rendezvous was a small island, 
lying thirty miles south of Biloxi, Mississippi and 100 miles from the 
mouth of the river and was to be Farragut 0 s base of operations. The 
i~Land had been seized on September 17 of the previous year by Connna.nder 
Melan.cton Smith of the Massachusetts as a preliminary step in the plan. 
The secret of the proposed New Orleans campaign was so wel1l kept 
that the Washington. Globe reported Farragut 0 s destination to be the 
.. ' 
. Mediterranean. Other speculation named Mobile, Galveston, and Savannah 
as possible destinations, but no one, especially in the South, thought 
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that the Union would dare attempt to capture New Orleans. Fox was 
increasingly annoyed by having what was to be the largest United States 
.naval operation up to that time referred to as "General Butler's expedi-
tion." 
On March 1, Farragut wrote to Fox suggesting that he capture Fort 
Livingst~ne and.thus close the latter avenue of approach to the Mississ-
ippi. He wanted to take the fort while waiting for Porter who was being 
detained at Key West ~n~il his mortar schooners appeared. Fox told 
Farragut that this was not feasible, that nothing should be allowed to· 
interfere with the main object of his expedition, "the succes@ of which 
is the down.fall of everything else. 1115 Fox said that Admiral Fot)te, 
who was driving from the North on the Mississippi, had had great success 
and might reach New Orleans before he did. Said Fox, ''A success at 
Fort Livingstone would cause some delay and might tend to strengthen 
other forts, while a want of success would do us most serious injury. 
If we fail let it be at the main point, where, if you succeed, all other 
victories are cast in the shade. 1116 
Farragut showed displeasure for the great opt;:imism Fox had,, for the 
New Orleans plan. He expressed this in his answer to a letter from Fox 
\ ' 
on Februar1, 12, in which the Asei.stant Secretary had shown satisfaction 
over the fact that .. the commander was satisfied with hh force. Farragut 
quickly pointed out that this reference had been to the New Orleans plan 
and not to the blockade, for which he could use fifteen. more vessels. 
Farragut told Fox that he hoped to realize the navy 8 s expectations at 
15Thompson and Wainwright, (:eds.), Confidential Corre$!pondence of 
G. V. !2,!, I, 306. 
161bid., I, 306-307. 
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New Orleans, but that he wished the department would realize the diffl-
culties involved. 
On February 20 at Ship Island Farragut started preparations, for 
I the attack, and encountered his first serious difficulty ~et~ing his 
vessels over sand bars. This difficulty had not been foreseen by Fox 
. . 
and threatened to destroy any hope of capturing New Orleans, even before 
the plan had a chance to succeed. It was necessary to get Farragut's 
large vessels over the bar at the head of the passes pf the. Mississippi 
' ' 
to get into the main stream of the river. (The river separ~tes into 
several branches and in each of these, as a matter of cours~, a bar is 
formed at the point of division). Befor~ the war it was known that 
enough water covered the ba~ to get the vessels through, but Fox had 
' 
not reckoned with his blockade, which had not allowed daily passage of 
big ships u.d as a result had permitted silt to coll~ct, which caused 
shallow water. These delta channels forced Farragut to spend a whole 
week pulling his ships across. This caused the secrecy of .the plan to 
be destroyed, as the South could now gauge the exact destination of tne 
expedition. The big ships were relieved of al.l their weight except coal 
and were dragged through a foot of mud by steamers. The biggest ship,- the 
CololC'ade~could not make it across the bar at all, which was a great blow 
to Farragut us plan. Being fifty feet .higher, than,J::he fo~ts, .the Colorado 
was expected to s11eep the forts 0 interiors with its guns. 
The New Orleans plan was three to five weeks .behi~d schedule by 
March 1, and Welles and Fox were now concerned and impatient. The de-
lays, however, were not Farragutns fault. Besides losing a little over 
a week in pulling his vessels over the bars, he was so short of coal 
that he had to borrow some from the army to keep his veesels ready for 
river seryice. When Fox heard ot this he became enraged and contacted 
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John Lenthall of New York, who was respo~$ible for the coal. Upon 
' investigation, Fox found that some of his messages had not been re-
ceived, that some ships had been lost in storms, while others had gone 
to the wrong destination. To make sure the coal would arrive on time 
from now on, Fox gave each ship an escort, and by April the coal was 
coming in regularly. Another delay was due to Porter, who was still at 
Key West waiting for his mortar schooners. During these delays Farragut 
repaired his ships and went over information on the forts sent to him by 
Fox. In reply to an imp~tie~t March letter from Fox, Farragut said, 
"The moment Captain Porter arrives, I will collect my vessel.s which are 
pretty close around me and dash up river, but I do not wish to make a 
display before I am ready as I wish to keep up the delusion that Mobile 
is the first object of attack. 1117 
Due to the countless delays th~t held up the execution of the New 
Orleans plan, Fox started to have doubts about Farragut 0 s ability and 
wondered if he had not make a mistake in choosing the man. Farragut 0s · 
remark that a struggle between iron.clads 2nd wooden ships would be very 
unequal and that he regretted the fact that the Department could not 
give him any, was interpreted by Fox as meaning that the Captain was 
losing confidence in the plan. After the Merrimac created a panic in 
Washington on March 9 by destroying the Cumberland and Congress, Fox 
sent Farragut all the information he had on ironclads being built in New 
Orleans and told him to move upriver before they were finished. The 
failure of the collllllander to do this, plus his letter to FOl:it. asldng for 
light craft vessels, caused a terrific jolt to the Assistant Secretary's 
faith in him. Fox did not understand that Farragut wanted these ships 
17 Lewis, D. G. Farragut, II, 23. 
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for the blockade and not for the New Orleans expedition. After these 
two incidents Fox wrote the following letter,,to Porter, "A cold shudder 
ran through me •••• I trust we have made no mistake in the m~n but his dis-
patches are very discouraging. It is not too late to rectify our mis-
take. You must frankly give me your views from Ship Island, for the 
cause of our country is above all personal considerations. I shall have 
· .18 
rto peace until I hear from you." Fox innnediately received from Porter 
a pertinent reply stating ,that he had already told the Assistant Secre-
tary that Farragut was no Nelson or Collinwood, but was still as compe-
tent as any man of bis rank. Porter concluded by stating that it was 
too late to change connna.nd at that time anyway.19 
Farragut in the meantime, knowing nothing of Fox 9 s lack of confi-
dence in him, had b~en poised and ready to go in early March, but was 
still being detained by Porter at Key West. Finally he could stand the 
del~ys n<i)) longer~ and on March 7, left for Pilot Town at the mouth of the 
Mississippi to begin operations. One day earlier, on March 6, Porter 9 s 
towing steamers finally arrived, and on that day he left .to join Farra-
gut at Ship Island. 
After the panic of March 9, Fox was very worried about the.ironclads 
nearing completion at New Orleans, and hoped that Farragut would hurry 
the e:K:p~©l.ition along. The Assistant Secretary no longer felt as sure 
of his plan as he once had. Welles, in a letter to Farragut on March 
15, told him to be extremely careful with regard to the Southern iron-
clads. For the first time Fox realized just how dangerous and daring 
,his plan was. Farragut was, and always had been, cognizant of the danger 
18Lewis, D. G. Farragut, II, 28. 
- ~-·-
19 Ibid., 29. 
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. involvied, sin«ll in a lette1r to Fox dated Ma1rch 21 told him tluJ.t he wH 
aware of what he had to e!llc@\Ulnter; it would either be ''death or vic-
tory for me..,, •• I have no fe81:rs "but all will do their duty 2ind if fortune 
does not smile on us we will be in the land of promiSle in le$S than 
ten days.n20 Fox had figured on a purely naval att,:mck with only such 
military cooperation as was necesH.t'Y to hold New Orleans. Once over 
the bar, the channel as far as the city had no natural obstruction, was 
clearly defined, and was easily followed by day or night without a 
pilot. The heavy current of ea1rly spring months, while it would prob-
ably retard p£H<!ll.ge of $hips am,td k.eep thiem ulll\der fire fo!Olger ~ W(l)uld 
make it difficult for the Sio"Uth to ~illl\tain in po1dti(Q)llll any bsi.rriergi 
set ll1lp. Fox knew th,at the forts to be Jp>1&Hed were pa>werful but he ab()) 
knew that ~hey were dependent olll\ New Orlealffis, Thinety miles upriverj for 
food alll\d supplies. If the S!hiJp>~ C(Q)Uld rua by the fort~ they would 
eveirut\\llail ly have to surrender. FiQJ:il!: a$ plan in bri<ef wai.s to turlll\ the forts 
by p.&Hing their fire, $eize thei:r collllim'lll1Tuircation!IB lill1le t10J the upper 
rive1r and their bai.Sle at New 01rle~n®~ and then hand New Orleai.ns. over to 
the anny. 
'!'he final sai.ilbllg orders Farr8g\1J.t received from Seicr<!lt~iry Well<HJ 
were~ 11 Wlllemi yo1U1 are completely rie.a1dy, you will collect $1ll1Ch versweh 
th~t can be spared fr@m the blockade $1llld pr(Q)ceed up the Missi~$ippi 
River and reduce the d®fen~®s which gu~~d the approaches t@ New Orliean$, 
when you will appear off t~~t city alll\d take p@ssession of it under the 
guns of y(Q)Ulr ~quadron 2nd h(Q)bt the American flai.g thereb., keepillll.g 
possession until troops can be sent to you. If the Mi$Sissippi 
Squadron f:r@m lC:~iiro shall not h$ve de$ceaded the :river, you will take 
advantage of the p~nic to push a st1rong force up the riveir to t~ke 
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their defenses in the-,rear. 1-121 
Just before leaving with the expedition Farragut expressed thanks 
to Fox for the trust and confidence he had placed in him and thanked 
him for the chance to command the expedition. Farragut said he would 
endeavor to merit the confidence and realize the expectations of both 
his ,friends' and the country.· \He said, "If I fail, it will not be 
" from want of exertion or determination to accomplish, but to circum-
st:ances beyond ,my control. 11 22 These remarks by the commander restored 
any confidence that Fox might have lost in him during the earlier delays. 
At 9:45 on the morning of April 18, 1862, Porter moved his mortar 
schooners into position and began b~mbarding forts Jackson and St. 
Philip. The battle for New Orleans had begun. The bombardment, which 
.was scheduled for forty-eight·hours h~d ·little.effect on the forts, forcing 
Porter to shell theim for four mo1r@ «lays, with still little effect. At 
the end of five days the store of ammunition was almost exhausted; the 
crews were worn out by their day-and-night labors~ and the mortar 
schooners were shaken and strained by the ceaseless concussion. By the 
morning of April 24, Farragut decided he had waited long enough and 
prepared to run by the forts. He gave the following orders, to his men: 
nNo vessel must withdraw from battle under any ctrcumstances, without 
the consent of the flag officer. I wish you to und~rstand that the day 
. ' 
is at hand when you will be called upon to meet the enemy in the worst 
2lthe !!!.!. of the Rebellion:! Compilation of the Official Records 
of the Union ,a:nd Confederate Navies in the .!!!!. of ~ Rebellion, (27 
vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), i, I, 7~8. Here~ 
after cited as Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies. 
-----·· - -- .. ·--. ------- ----
~2thompson and Wainwright, (.eds.), Confidential Correspondence of 
· G. !• FOXp I, 308. · ,I 
form possible in our profession.''~~ 
Through lette~s from Fox, reports from Southern Unionists, and 
messages from arm.y scouts, Farragut knew the defenses of the South on 
the Mississippi were very formidable and had been deemed impregnable 
by French and English naval observers. From the forts below New Orleans 
to Gairo, there was scarcely a point on either shore where they had not 
planted a fort or a battery. Each fort had been built in a place where 
natural advantages could be used -- heavy cover, high ledges, curves in. 
the river, river currents. The Confederate forts had heavy rifles and 
ten inch guns, plus thirteen armed steamers, the steam battery Louisiana, 
and the ram Manassas. Besides this, a strong barrier, made up of three 
foot s~~~re timbers firmly placed together, plus an enormous iron chain 
supported by eight hulks of schooners, was thrown across the river at 
point blank range from the forts. Although Farragut had no knowledge 
of it as yet, the Confederates were abo prepared to use fire ships if 
necessary. "To open the Mississippi and capture New Orleans, to restore 
and maintain up it, from the Ohio to the sea, free and safe Davigation,'' 
said naval historian Charles Boynton, "was certainly one of the most 
dangerous and difficult enterprises of the war, perhaps it may be safely 
said, of modern times." 24 . 
At 1:55 A.M. on April 24 the attack began. All men were apprehen-
sive upon the manner in which each could manage his ship and fight his 
vessel in the night, through the swift currents of an unknoWlll. river, in 
constant danger of ramming each other. The plan had the fleet divided 
into.three divisions; one would run the gantlet and the other two would 
23 
,oyntoni, History of .£!!!. Navy During El!! Rebellion, II, 161. 
24tbid., 139. 
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hit Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip. At the sa.ine time five steamers 
of the mortar fleet would throw grape and canister into the batteries 
of the forts to silence their guns. The fleet passed t~e forts in these 
three divisions; the first, under Captain Theodore Bailey, the second, 
under Farragut, and the third, under Captain Henry H. Bell. Eight 
steam sloops of war and fifteen wooden gunboats, amidst terrific fire, 
crashed through the boom line strung across the river and ran the gant-
let of fire rafu, armored rams, and the river defenSJe fleet 8 with 
surprisingly few casualties. When Farragut 0 s fleet anchored off shore 
on April 25, New Orleans._had been abandoned by the Con.federates. On 
the following day, Union forces took possession. Two days later, forts 
St. Philip and Jackson surrendered. 
Fox was jubilant when he heard of the fall of New Orleans and 
immediately wrote to Farragut~ "Your unparalleled achievementsi are be-
fore the country and are gratefully acknowledged throughout the breadth 
of the whole land1! 2~, Fex w~si m~r$· ·pleased because this"-'w~s:;a :naval..;, i · 
victory than he wa8J becau$e it was a great Union victory. ·In a letter 
to Porter he said that the prestige of the navy was at its highest 
poin~ ever, and that even England could not produce such a victory by 
her fleet. Said the Auhtant Secretary, ''I am happy at having relied 
entirely upon the navy to capture New Orleans. I maintained it ~nd th·e 
country is happy with the result.n 26 Fox even congratulated General 
Butler for his part in the campaign but sensed, even a.'t: that early 
date, what was to come out of Butler 0 s rule of New Orleans, when he 
25:~h~mpson and W~inwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspondence of 
G. y/ Fox, I~ -.313. .. - -
26 . -
. Ib1d., 313-314. 
62 
said, "Wishing you all the .su-ccesis and feeling. the deepest interest in 
your movements since l had so much to do with sending you there. Believe 
me. " 27 It wa"' t i t h b th f 11 i t t ~ no an easy v c ory, as was sown y e o ow ng s a e-
ment by David Porter in a letter to Fox: "It will take me te:n years to 
rest and recover from the exhaustion caused by vexation of spirit .. in 
. . \' 
the last year. My liver is completely. turned upside down.w2~ .• 
The running of the forts and the capture of New Orleans showed that 
the OfJginal Fox plan would have been.superior to the.Fox-Porter plan 
that was used. When General Mansfield L~e\l (Confederate commander on 
the Mississippi) learned of the mortar flotilla in February, he : , 
commenced preparations for a defense against a naval attack. If he had 
received the he,lp he asked for, the 111aval e;x.pedition might not b.a~e 
succeeded. Fox 0s view had been that the bombardment would really in-
, ·, 
flict little injury to the forts, while such a fleet would impede move-
ments~ arouse vigilance, and lead to preparations for a more formidable 
defense. This is precisely what happened. 
After the war, in support of his original plan, Fox wrote.that the 
delay of six days awa,i ting Porter Os reduction of the forts, " ••• un.ques-
29 tionably augmented the·defenses at New Orleans." How precious were 
the hours during which the commander delayed the ascent is shown by the 
~act that the Louisiana, which Porter represented ~s the most formidable 
ironclad in the world, was almost ready; yet the Union had not a single 
27James Marshall, (ed.)» Private and Official Correspo~dence of' 
General Benjamin Butler, (5 vols., Norwood, Massachusetts:· The Plimpton ·. 
Press, i917), I, 502. 
2tlwest, .!!!, Second Admiral, II,. 141. 
29,,, 
··• Lewis, !• G •. Farragut, II, 52. 
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ironclad to oppose it. Said Fox, "The fire rafts, naval defenses, 
rams, and obstructions which really constituted the peril to Farragut 
were unquestionably innnensely increased by every hour's delay to try 
the effects of the bombardment.u30 
General Viscount Wolseley of England, an unprejudiced authority 
on military affairs during the Civil War, backed Fox's arguments by 
stating that the large number of shells actually exploded in the forts 
. . ~ 
had comparatively little effect on them. Said Wolseley, "Had:it been 
necessary to silence by mortar fire the guns of Fort Jackson and the 
water battery before the ships ran the. gantlet between Forts Jackson 
and St. Philip, David Farragut would never have achieved his success. 11 31 
The capture of New Orleans was significant as the last victory won 
by wooden vessels of the United States Navy. It' was the crowing ex-
ploit of the oldtime navy, for after the Merrimac-Monitor b~ttle, the 
wooden vessels gave way to iroirn.cl2ds. The plan by Fox to launch a 
naval attack on New Orleans was one of the great strategic decisions of 
the war, and had the plan been followed up by the military with a co-
ordinated attack against Port Hudson and Vicksburg, the war might have 
,ended as much as a year earlier. 
• • I •, 
This great naval battle of the Civil War was the boldest and most 
successful attempt eyer to match wooden ships against forts at close 
range, when the forts had heavy guns and were ·assisted by ironclad rams 
and a fleet almost ~s numerous as the one that attacked them. Fox 0 s plan 
for the capture of New Orleans had, before the battle, caused anxiety 
30' 
, Lewh~ ~. Q_. F-ar:ragut, II, 52. 
!1• 
311.viscount Wolseley, ''An English View of the Civil War,'' The North 
American Review, CXLIX )! (1889), ,.31. 
~~ 
64 
among many Union leaders. It was not unreasonable to assume that with 
the Louisiana and Manassas, the Confederacy would destroy the Union 
fleet after the shattering fire of the forts. Despite these doubts 
about his plan, Fox had carefully surveyed the character and armaments 
of the forts, the peril of a night attack, and the power of the Con-
federate fleet. On the other hand, he had the element of surprise 
working for him. Nobody in the South before the attack on New Orleans 
· expected such a move. The defense of the river was conside,:ed. impreg-
nable by men skilled in war while the feeling in New Orleans wa~ one of 
insolence and security. The chief fear of the Confederate commanders 
., 
at forts Jackson altlld St. Philip was that the severity of their fire 
might turn back the fleet before it was in their power. 
The significance of Fox 0 s plan and the capture of New Orleans is 
note-worthy in that it helped kill the strength and backbone of the 
,:.t~~'.: 
Confederacy. The victory at New Orleans and eventual openi.ng of the 
' Mississippi was a great boost to the Union at a time when it badly 
i 
needed a boo$t. A failure would have been disastrous, as the war would 
have been greatly prolonged. 'l'he continued control of the lower Missfa .. · .. 
sippi would have enabled the South to dra.w unlimited suppliH from west 
'.1 
of the river~ while holding as a· last resort the possibility of with-
drawal into Texas attd. contintdng the struggle in the hope of eventually. 
obtaining recognition from England and France. 
The knowledge that powerful ironclads were being bu.ilt at New 
Orleans caused Fox to intensify his efforts to capture that city in the 
early months of 1862. He realized that if New Orleans stayed in Con-
federate hands much longer and the ironclads were completed, the Union 
squadron on the Mississippi.would be in critical danger. Had the city 
been left three months longer to perfect. its defenses,, the Union I s 
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wooden fleet would have been driven north and the entire Southern coast 
would have been sealed against them. The blockade might then have been·· 
~ '32 
raised and the independence of the Confederacy recognized by Europe •.... 
As a demoralizing blow to the South, the captur~ of New Orleans 
ranks with Sherman°s march to the sea. The blow here was even greater 
because it came earlier in the war._ For three years the Confederacy 
was deprived of two important forts and her largest port of entry for 
military and economic supplies from the outside world. Significant 
advantages obtained by the Union from this victory were (1) the sealing 
of the ~lockade at its most difficult point, (2) the destruction of. 
potentia~ly powerful enemy ironclads while they were still being built, 
(3) the control of the Southern gateway to the Mississippi River by 
the Union. 
The importance of the capture of New Orleans was felt immediately 
all over the world. In the South the fall of the Cresent City may.have 
been the dagger in her back that finally killed her. The failure of 
Napoleon III of France to recognize the Confederacy without England hiui 
. · - - - 33 
been traced. by some historians to the fall of New Orleans. . If Fox's 
plan had failed, it is not unlikely that a few months later, when Mc-
Clellan°s army was severely hurt in Virginia, England would have taken 
e teps to recognize the Confederacy.-
32Porter, Naval History~ the CivU War, 246-247. 
?3&han, Admiral Farragut, 175-176. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CHARLESTON BLOCKADE 
As Boston was reg~rded as the cradle of American liberty during the 
Re~~lutionary War, s~ Charleston wa$ considered the nursery of disunion 
during the Civil War •. Richmond was the Unfon°s chief ob>jective, as its 
fall was expected to end the war, but it was to Charleston.that the 
dislike of the N~rth was directed. The second largest city of the 
South, Charleston was the c,u.dle of secession; it was here that the flag 
was first fired on. In the words of Secretary of the Navy Welles, "The 
moral effect of its capture wauld 1:»e great. 11 1 If Charleston could be 
taken, the n~tienal flag and honor would be partially restored. Thus 
public sentiment was heavy for an early demonstration against the South 
Carolina strongh~ld. 
Although the value to morale ef eapturi~g Charleston was a chief 
reason for operatic:>11U! against that city~ certain strategic acivantages 
were. not te hie overlo@ked. o Despite a very determined blockade b>y the 
South,Atlan.tic Blockading Sq"1&aidr«1»n, Charleston was one of two points 
(Wilmington was the other) threugh which munitions of war amd other sup-
plies frem E~rope found entrance tQ the Cenfederaey. If the city could 
be capture«i, a gap_ing hole in the Union blockade would 'be filled. Union. 
naval heads worried about ironcl~ds being huilt, both in Charleston and 
,_ 
Savannah, Georgia. If this was allowed te continue the blockade might 
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possibly be broken by ironclad ral!DS, n~t ~nly at Charleston, but up and 
down the Atlantic Coast. If Charleston could be taken, not only would 
the huildiD$ of ironclads be stopped there, ~ut building would also 
cease in Savannah, which depended on Charleston ~or mater.iah and pro-
tection. 
Finally, the threat of foreign intervention by either France or 
Englamd was a cause of great concern to the Union d\lring 1862 a~d early 
1863 when the UniGJn a~ies were suffering from defeats at Fredricksbux:g 
and Chancellorsville. If the Confederacy could show that they could 
maintain Ch&rlestcn and break the Union blockade cf that city, the 
chances f~r recognition would have been extremely good. 
Thus Charleston , 'became a city of. great importamce to bo,th. North 
and South during the Civil War. Lincoln and the North wanted Fort Sum-
ter and ChS!.rlest0n because both were symbols of secession; the South was 
just as determined to keep them for that very same reason. With this in 
mind, the Assistant Secretary conceived in early 1862 a naval plan to 
take Charleston. Fox realized that this attempt would prGbably l)e the 
,,.,, 
most difficult t~sk undertaken wy the navy during the war, but he also 
realized that the advantages t@ be gained by success were Doth great and 
vital t~ the Union. He also knew that the man whe conceived such a 
daring plan and achieved success wuli win unboun~ed popularity and 'be-
.. .• • I 
come a great hero t~ the Union. 
· Fi:lix was disgus~ed with the futile attempts that haid been .made to 
blockade Charleston.2. , The Grd1nary p(®Sitien of the 'blockading S,pJ.US.dron 
was approximately fGur miles from land, and it was not a difficult feat 
for Emglish steamers to pass through the bleckaders at: night and piaes at 
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daylig~t into the harb_or by one --~f nu.mereuai channeh. The city c~uld 
be apprroa~hed by fSlmall steamers from the· mortheailt by means of Bull Os 
' 
' 
.. Bay through. an interior channel, while Stono a1nd othe:r inlets were:,.open 
from the sGuthwest. 
In ;December, 1861, Fex proposed a plan to help make the blockade 
of Charleston Harbor more effective by sinking a stone fleet at the 
entrance~ ly sinking thirty old stm'Jle~filled whaling ves$els, purchased 
b>y the govemment fer $160., 000, FeK hoped to cl(ll)se the entrance to ·: 
Ob.arleston •. 'flaese ships were sunk in r~ws en the ba; under the direc-
tion ef Captain C!harles Davis on the night of Decem.1:u~r 6. . This action 
by the Unien Navy caused a sharp pr!G!!test to be made by the.English 
government, sympathetic t~ the South and worried about their profitable 
smuggling operations. They were dismayed at the Union for ruining a 
good harb~r, and hinted that this aetion might be eause for a declaration 
ef war or reecg:nition of the Confederacy~ 3 ; ,, { The government hurriedly 
told the British that they would leave two gooa channels open. 
The plan proved te he a failure. Tb.e vessels buried themselves 
in the sand or were gradually moved out of pGsidon by the action of 
the w~ter. The ~ld hulks that did not sink certainly offered no dis-
advantage to incoming vessels and were even used as guides to indicate 
new channels washed out by the currents. When the British realized 
these sunken hulls offered no obstruction to the channels~ their anger 
subsided, and relations· warmed. up once again. 
The Assistant Secretary on March 6 t~ld Admiral Du.Pont, heading 
the South Atlantic Blockading S~dron, that a regular trade seemed to 
be going on from Nassau and. Havana t~ the United States 0 Southern. coast. 
3 ' )''·.Boynten., History !!. .!:!!!. !!!I. Du.ring the Rebellion, II, 425-426. 
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believe that the Confederates uiu~d CurlHton much, but that the bilock.-
a.de 1hould be imcre.iu11ed. In this! letter· FIQ>X hinted -that he thought the 
block.ad~ of Charle$ton would not be-very effective and that possibly 
the city might have to be captured in order to make it so. 
The dramatic Moniter-Merrimac battle of March 9, 1862, was obser-
ved with intere$t by Fox off Hampto~ Roads and gave him the idea for 
his Charle$ton plan. From observing thi$ battle, Fox picked up a tremen-
dous amount of confidence in ironclad ships. Unfortunately, he made the 
fatal err~r of mistaking their great defensive power to mean that they 
also were a great offensive weapon. This brash confidence would prove 
to be the fatal error of the Charleston plan. After the Merrimac-Moni-
tor battle, Fox th~ught that turret vessels might de what wooden ships 
could not-= capture Cha:rr:lest~n. Th.e Assistamt Secretary was ex~ited 
about the pl!llltenUality of thea1e irti»ncladi! amid succeeded. in convincing 
had fet'l!lled the b.igheilt 0>pini«:1>n as to the force and inwln.erability of 
peril that his imagination led him. to hopesi not te be realized. It was 
at thi$ point that Fox conceived Gf the plan to capture Charlest~n by 
using monitors. Although the c0>nditioms w~re totally different, lil\O dis-
tinction whatever was made between the potentiality of DMl»nitcrs with 
respect t0 other ships and their a~ility to iclf))pe with lud defeDses. 
Under this misa,prehensien and without waiting for further tests of the 
vesseb 0 effensive pewer, Fox cenvinced the Navy Department to em'bark 
on a ma.Hive building program of 1M1Dit111»rs. Fox thought they would revolu-
tionize all existing conditions of n&val warfare, and these rash predic~ 
tions fer the i~onclads tended to create false optimism in the North. 
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FOE1 s plan for the captur~ of Cnarleston was ta he purely naval. 
Tb.e ~sistant Secretary had been distressed hy all the ~ttention showered 
up~n the army when the m&"tY, thrsughout the war, he believed, had do~e 
.much mere. If the navy cetild take Charleston on its own, reasoned Fox, 
it would be rid ef a feeling of inferiority from which it had suffered. 
!, 
since 1812. Green army volunteers, poorly trained and poorly led, plus 
the account of the military bungling of General David Bunter in the 
evacuation of.James Island, convinced Welles and the .Assistant Secretary 
. I • 
that the best way to operate was alone, as at Port Royal and New Orleans.4 
Fox's plan therefore called for a ferce of menitors to be sent inside 
Charleston Harb'or, ignoring Fort Sum.ter and the other forts at the en-
trance. Once iluiide, they would. compel the surrender of the fc.r.ts by-
threat of l,cmbar.4ing Charleston. 
In .April, ·1862., Fox told DuPont that the summer werk of the Union 
must be 'dene Dy the Navy, and_effered the irenc~ads Monitor anci Galena to 
. hi:in·,.for-'t:lti-8'-c-purpei.e,:~o~, ·also .asked his views on Charlesto~. Fox then 
mentioned that the constant.running of the blockade by ships from Havana 
and Nassau, and the escape of the Nashvile, had caused petitions to be 
circulated caU:l.ng. for the remeval ,ef Secretary Welles. Fox inferred 
... ·, 
that the attack en Charleston would help maintain. the political career 
cf the Secretary., 
.A May letter to DuPont shewed Fex•s enthusiasm fer the Charleston 
attack and his _demand that the army be excluded: "If I _give you the!!!!_-
. . ' 
~ and Galena don'~ you think we can go squarely at it by the Channel 
4 
west, Giaeon Welles, Lincoln°s !!.!:!l Department, 220. 
· 5Thompa~a and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential C~rrespondenee of 
!• !• !!!, I, 115. 
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as. to make it puely rMtvy? hy other plan we shall play 1ecll!)tMl. Port 
Royal and New Orleaiu1 suit me ••• ~if you can finhh Charle$t:on with the 
navy the country will rejeice aJ,0>ve all other vie tories. '' 6 Fox re-
marked to DuPont that it might be impossible, but he felt that the 
crowni~g act of the war ought to be accomplished by the navy: "I feel 
that my_duties are twofold: first, to beat our Southern friends and 
second, to beat the army. We have done it so far and people acknowledge 
it and give us credit." 7 Port Rey.al and New Orleans were mentioned by 
Fox as examples of naval successes; the IM!l.vy knocked over the forts with 
the army looking on. He stated that the Union generals never gave the 
n~vy any lllredit, but the Confederate seldiers and newspapers showed 
them plenty of respect. After telling the Admiral that the Menitor 
could go all over the harbor and return unscathed because she was impreg-
nable,.Fox s&idg "If you can go to Charleston, you will go there with 
the army ai ~pectatiolr:'s as we arranged it: at Fort Royal.;,s 
On September, 1862, Fox m&de the first official mention of an attack 
on Charleston in a letter to Captain A. c. Rhind of the South Atlantic 
Squadron: "We are having a dark spell just now,t' he wrote, refe,:ring to 
military losses 9 "our next blow will hie Charleston and the day is fast 
approaching."~ 
Admiral Dulent was called to Washington in December of 1862 fer 
preliminary di$cussicin.s with the President and Navy Department on. the 
6".fhompson. and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspondence.!! 
!• Y. ~' I, }1~~120. 
7 Ihlid., 126. 
81iid., 192-193. 
9 Ibid., II, 368. 
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subject of Charleston. At this me®ting Fox fir51t set forth.his plan to 
DuPont and Fre@lident Linceln, neither of whem had.previously heard of 
it. Welles did not take much part in the conversation, as Fex was very 
familiar with Charleston and did most of the talking. The Assistant 
Secretary impressed upon DuPont amd the President the complete eonfi-
dence ef the Navy Departmemt in the aggressive power of the monitors 
against. land fortifications. Fox even remarked that one monitor alone 
-
might' cause the evacuation of Ch~rleston. DuPont was quick to remind 
the Assistant Secretary that three monitors (Monitor, Galena, Naugatuck) 
with several wooden gunb~ats had earlier failed to take Fort Darling, 
despite great gallantry. 
Even hefore DuPont was called to the Washington meeting, he had 
already decided that Charleston would have to be taken 'by amph.~bious 
&Ha.ult. His plu called for 25,000 SC!>ldiers to attack Cu.rlesten from 
James Island, while the fleet attacked the harbor in a joint army-navy 
operation. 'fh:e army was ready at_ tb.ls time t:0 furnish enough men for 
an amphibieus assault, 10,000 having been transferred'to Por~ Rey.al in 
the summer of 1862, with mere on the way. Fox brushe~ aside. these 
recemmendations hy DuPqnt, claiming that tne mcniters were invincible 
. . 
and could come and go inside Clun:leilton ijar'bior without hiiini-. .The Assis-
tant Secretary was doing all the talking now and could not see why the 
army had to he used when ~he ironclads were invincible amd the navy had 
a chance for once to get some long ieserved credit. After Fox ended 
~- . 
his arguments, .Pont, against his ~etter judgment, r_emained quiet. He 
was afraid that if he insisted upCH!I a co-ordinated attack he would be 
replaced by someone else and deprived of great fame in case of success 
.. 
at Charleston. He alsttill did n.ot want to make it .seem as if h.e was 
shirking his duty. 
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When the conference broke up nething had really been settled. 
Fox still held t:hat ironclads were invincible and that the attack should 
be naval. DuPont, although unusually quiet at the meeting, still be-
lieved in an army-navy att.ack, not placing too much confidence as yet 
in the monitors. Because DuPont had not really disagreed with him, 
Fox took this to mean the Admiral was in full agreement with his views 
and plan. Here was the cause of the failure of the plan. The two chief 
figures, necessary to the success of the operation, both worked for 
its success in directly opposite way1. This created false optimism and 
hurt the preliminary operations. Said DuPont after the war about the 
December meeting, "The Department will therefore perceive that when I 
left Washington there. was really nothing matured, though I was impressed 
with the fixed determination of the Department that Charleston should be 
attacked, and that with the ironclads, the attack must be successful. 1110 ' 
Soon after the meeting a problem of leadership arose. Admiral Dahl-
gren, the navy 0 s top ordnance officer and personal favorite of President 
Lincoln, heard about DuPont 0 s feelings toward an exclusively naval 
attack on Charles ton and applied for command of the South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron. Fox was adamant that DuPont should continue as 
head of the squadron, not only because of his previous success at Port 
Royal, but because he had appointed him as commander of the South Atlan-
tic Blockade •. However, Welles realized that Dahlgren had influence with 
Lincoln and tried to compromise. He asked DuPont if he would consent 
to a division of labor, with Dahlgren handling the flotilla of ironclads 
while DuPont devoted himself to the blockade, although remaining chief 
,~(!a. A. DuPont, Rear Admiral Samuel Francis 
(New York: J. J. Little and Ives Co., 1926), 164. 
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squadron eoD11Um.der. DuPent indignantly refused, stating that Dahlgren 
had before preferred shore duty to sterner.service afloat but new wanted 
the henors of sea service. Because ef his key victory at Port Royal 
plus Fox 0 s infiuemce, he remained eommancier of the squadron. 
With the plan at least tentatively agreed upon, Fox went hefore 
Congress te ask for money to use on a massive building pr~gram of moni-
tors. In June, 1862, he told that body that he would give them Charles-
ton by the time the next iession convened if they would appropriate the 
money for the invincible ironclads. He remarked to a special committee 
on naval affairs that once the Merrimac was destroyed, the navy would 
have no trouble taking the Monitor into Charleston. To do this, kow-
ever, he needed mcney for the censtruction of an ironclad fleet. Con-
vinced by Fox's arguments, Congress appropriated encugh funds to Duild 
twenty-seven ironclads, complete with fifteen inch Dahlgren gums, alse 
advocated by F@:11:. This acti@n, pbHl the enthusiasm of the Assistant 
Secretary, caused an unprecejented feeling of optimism in the North 
that was destined to 'be rudely deflated when the attack on Charleston 
failed. 
Fox came under heavy criticism from Senator Jehn Hale.of Vermont 
and some of the other old navy men in Congress fer his excessive commit-
ment to build me!llitors, while neglecti~g other types of ships. Despi.te 
this criticism and the ensuing failure of the mcnitors at Cnarleston, 
Fox was-right in hit demand for an ironclad navy. The era of irenclads 
had definitely ~egun; and any other than these vessels weuld have me~ 
a cGmplete disaster at Charleston. The KeGkuk, the only non-monitor at 
Charleston, proved this theory, as she was so shattered by enemy fire 
that in a few minutes she was forced t~ withdraw and later sank •. 
The Asshtant Secretary selected· al.l the commanders for the at.tack 
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on Charlesten and chose only the bravest and best to ia$ure DuPont of 
. . 
every chance for success. The cmnmanders were Percival Drayton, John 
Worden, A. c. Rhind, George Rodgers, Daniel Amonen, John Rodgers, Thomas 
Turner, Donald Fairfax, and John Down.es, all of whom would make their 
names during the Civil War. To insure speed in constructing the ves-
sels, the Assistant Secretary personally made many trips to New York tm 
check on the prog~ess of the ir«imclad~. When he did not have time, he 
periodically sent someone else. 
The eptimblm that Fox h.eld a.t the time of the December meeting on 
the pewer GJf .ironclads and the expected success of the Ch.arletllton attack .1 
.increased rathe!t' than diminished during the next four months, despite 
caution urged by DuPont and other high ranking naval officers. In 
January Fo~ wrete DuPont that Union armies were advancing and that the 
. I . 
"rebellion staggers to receive the f:i.nal blow by your avengim.g ann, at 
Charlest~n and Savannah. The eye$ ~f the whole country a!t'e en you •••• 
I commend you to Bis .keepfo.g with no misgivings as t<i:> the result.nll 
added to the Navy Department building in Washington and a fine flag 
fell. He told the Admiral that if Fort Sumter 0 s flag was taken it would 
be flown u~der the Union flag. 
nor did he want much. However~ any hope he might have had for at least 
nominal military aid W.!!l.$ de!lltroyed 'by whai.t he called the "dhgraeeful 
evacuati0>n" of JamH Ishnul by General Hunter in Julhe of 1862. 12 · 
11:rnomp~on and Wainwright, {ed~.>» C~nfidenti~l Cerre$poademce of 
G. V. Fox, 1 9 173 • 
. 
121b>id.. 9 142. 
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Over 10,000 men were taken off the island on the whim that they were 
not being adequately supported and supplied_. Before this evacuation, 
Fox seemed to have been willing to accept at least limited military 
help, an.d when Hunter evacuated the islancl he was understandably bitter. 
In a letter to DuPont shortly after the withdrawal, he remarked: "The 
James Island evacuation was most disgraceful. Had they helcl their posi-
tions, it would have prevented rein:forc-ents from leaving.for Richmond 
•••• you will b.a:ve to do it fjfh.arlestt,n/ 'as you have done everything 
else, ,alone." 13 The loss of James Island was a severe blow to any pro-
posed attempt to capture Charleston. It was the only place where the 
army could maintain a fi'lt'm base of operations in complete caJ1111Wnication 
with the navy. Batteries could have been set up to help protect the_ 
fleet in Charleston Harbor, and a jumping-off place for the soldiers 
could have been established. Commemted Captain Drayton (one of DuPont 0 s 
highly rated junior co11111lalllders) about the evacuation: 11 I do not believe 
Charleston can be taken except through James Island and trust that the 
14 
rebellion cannot end until its cradle is in. our possession." : 
Du.Poat, from the first day he beard of Fox's plan, attempted to 
melt the great optimism and confidence shown by the Assistant Secretary 
concerning the Charleston attack. In May, 1862, he cautioned Fox to 
think coolly and dispassionately 9n the subject. He told the Auis-
tant Secretary to keep the following things in mind with regard to the 
attack: (1) there would be no running the gantlet night or day as had 
been done at New Orleans; (2) there could be no bombardment of a week 
13Tmompsoa and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspon4ence !f 
G. V. !!!• I, 142. 
14ibid., 136. 
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to fatigue or demoralize the enemy, for the ~efenses of tb.e Mis~issippi 
were the merest shams in comparison; (3) for thirteen months ·the indus-
try of the Confederates :tn the harbor ha<d b_een ceaseless; (4) Fort Sum-
ter had been strengthened by a water battery, Cummings,Point was covered 
by heavy works, the middle ground had been piled and fortified, and 
Fort Johnson, Castle Pinckney, and Fort Moultrie improved. Concluding, 
DuPont remarked: "I merely allude to all this, that your owm intelli-
gent and brave mind may not be carried away by a superficial view.of 
t t r\15 recen even s • • • • , Later, in September, DuPont again cautioned Fox: 
"De not go it half cocked about Charleston, it is a bigger job than 
Port Royal •••• loss of life is nothing but failure now at Charleston is 
ten times the failure elsewhere.••16 
During the early days of March, 1863, DuPont became dismayed at 
the continued overconfidence of Fox in thinking the monitors would take 
Charleston with little or no trouble. Fox had commented th,it he thought 
the fleet might enter the harbor silently and surprise the city. lie 
received this cynical DuPont reply: "Excuse me but I could F-Ot ~ut smile 
at your gran~ plan of sailing in silently on our friends, there is no 
question whsi.t the result would be ••• '. l think we shall have to batter 
' 17 
and pound li&eyGmd any precedent in h.iaitery.n· ·' 
There is nc doubt th.at Fox wo.ted Ch,uleston as 'much for the glory 
it would bring the navy as fClllr its stra.tegic value to the Union. He 
may well nave ahlo considered the personal glory involved. Farragut had 
15 Thompson and Wainwright, (eds .• ), Confidential Correspondence .2,! 
G. V,;·F~x, I, l22ml23. 
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first '.called t;hh latter fact to the attention of Welles by t~llb.g 
the Secretary that Fox had often signed his name to telegrams sent by 
Welles. Welles said that he was aware of Fox 8 s desire to get his name 
in the history of the times, bt;tt that h.e considered this fault very 
minor • 
.After the fall of Port Pulaski to Union forces in April, 1862, 
the defense of C~arleston Harbor ~as increased by the Confederates; A 
fort on Cummings Point was built, and posit.ions at Castle Pinckney and 
Fort Moultrie were strengthened. However, it was not until General 
Beauregard took command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia 
in September, 1862, that the defense of Charleston was really strength-
' 
ened. He quickly concluded upon investigation, that the defense of the 
harbor.could not withstand a Union ironclad attack and quickly moved 
·to revise it. Beauregard had more mines dumped, ropes st~etched across 
the channel, and poles driven into the water. He hoped that by doing 
this 9 he would entangle Union ships, allowing forts to concentrate their 
fire in one area. More batteries were built and a continuous line of 
lignal stations was established, while in Clla.rleston itself two iron-
clads, the PalmettG State-and Chicer.al, were being built to aid int.he 
i 
city 9 e defel!!!.se. 
Beauregard had conceived of five approaches by which the Union 
could attack Charle_~ton in the early months of 1863. They were (1) 
from lull u I Bay to the north; (2) from the Southern route, attempting 
to take Charleston· from the rear:; (3) from James Island ·to the south; 
(4) from Sulliva,n ° s ls land to the north; and (5) from Morris Island. 
Of these ·five approaches the one mo11t feared by the General was the 
Jamee Island avenue. This island contained few Con.fed~rate troops 'for 
I • . 
the long coast line they had to defend, which left, them vulnerable to 
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capture by a, nominal Union force. If this could have been ac:c~mplisl_'led, 
Unio~ troops might have set up batteries a.ad bombarded Charleston, for-
cing its surrender. 
By the early winter months of the new year, under the supervision 
of scientific engineers, Charleston Harbor became one of the strongest 
defensive positions in the world, not, by means of masonry defenses but 
by well constructed and located earthworks, armed with the heaviest 
guns then known, both rifled and smooth bore.18 An enemy coming in 
from the sea would have to pass between Sullivan°s Island on the north 
and MGrris Isl.and en the south, both of which were lined with forts 
and batteries, including Moultrie and Wagner, while just beyond Moul-
rie stood formU.able Fort Sumter. Beyond Sumter and protecting the 
inner harbor were rope, frame, 8.11ld pile obstructions, countless torpe-
does, forts and batteries at every key position, and several ironclads. 
Furthermore, it w~s .nQt possible for any naval vessel to reach Charles-
ton. witheut threading its way through. narrow and intricate .. channels 
blocked by ebstructiens. The danger of shoals for the ironclads to 
negotiate was also an everpresent problem. 
_In the sprinig and summer of 1862, hi.bl mind occupied with other 
naval strategy, Gueitavus Fox b.ad tc be ecm.tent with maintaining~ fairly 
efficient blc».ckade of Charlesten and reconno.itering in all directiotts .to 
discover sGme practical method of approach to the city. DuPont told 
Fqx, who never really believed him, that the defense of Charleston could 
not be compared to that of New Orlem:u1 in 1862. Fox still thought th.at 
any extra disadvantages at Charlesten would be more than offset by the 
' 
use of monitQrs. DuPent explained that after Farragut had run by Fort 
18 
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St. Philip -and F~irt_ Jackson, there had peen mi.ething of a formid&1J.ble 
' 
nature to stop hint from taking New Orleal'ils. With Charle$lt<m it was 
different. If he ran by Fart Sumter, he would only run into other 
fort$, ph.1si batterie$l, mines, obs-tiructions, and Confederate artillery, 
all possessing the fine$t ordnance used at that time. But the Assis-
tant Secretary still maintained his faith in th~power of the ironclads. 
Fox worked feveri$hly through the fall of 1862 and the winter of 
1862-1863 obtaining more information on Charle!!lton and perfecting his 
info:nnati~n on the ob$tru~tions and fortifications of the city. Finally, 
he thought he had found a way to p$H tlu:ough the dangerou$ water ob-
,J' 
struction® by using iron rafts pushed by monitors. In December work 
was immediately started on these rams. '!'he Assistant Secretary hired 
two torpedo men to handle the torpedoes in the h.t.rbor. Fox thought that 
' the rams being bui_lt would have little trouble smashing through the 
obstiruction~g nMy impression is that either of our men could clear our 
rafts and piles seas to open a passage and to destroy the city and 
19 have the ferts." With extreme audacity and little regard for the 
he should av~id damaging United St~tes property wherever pO$Sible. 
Fox bec2me a little worried during the summer of 1862 when DuPont 
told him to push construction of the ironclads because Charleston and 
Savannah were building them £a$ter than the Union. The As$istant Sec~ 
1i:-etary had memories of the Confederate ram Arkan$aS and the damage 
she had caused at New Orleans and shuddered to think of a repeat per-
19
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fo:rnw.nce of that ephode. H:h eOlnfidence in DuPont and the ironclads 
still remained firm, however: 11 If I did not feel so much confidence in 
your resiourees and in the cr:y O all O I well O from your !riquadr«ai11, I should· 
20 
take a.pprehe1ulion about the ironcla.d1i at Savannah and Cb..arleaiten.n 
The As1istant Secretary 1ent all the ironclads available, including 
those newly completeds to Charleston at the expense of Farragut on the 
troyed by Confederate rams. After the Arkansas incident Farragut pleaded 
for DlCil>re ironclads, but Fox refused reluctantly, ta.king a calculated risk 
that Farra.gut could hold his own until DuPont captured Charleston. 
ton were solved in a hurry ~Y Fox. The first problem was the lack of 
coal for the wloeka.ding squadron, which forced DuPont to borrow from the 
army. F~x immediately put pirell$Ure on John Lenthall, the navy 01 New York 
coal col!l!.trSJ.~it:@r, and the fuel was soc»n f6lllrthcoming. The prest, by con-
tinua.lly giving the·SJ.irmy xoollt of the credit and by dn.gling out two or 
three naval @fficers for pr&1$e after every battle, caused the morale 
of DuPont 01l fleet to sink to a low ebb in the summer of 1862, with the 
rHult that the Admiral asked Fox tll> do something about it. Thb he did 
by iHuing all nav.!l!.1 reports at the ai~e time and by telling the re-, 
pcn:tcn:1 informally that if they did net lilt!Q)p the unfair .and inac~'urate 
reporting, they would have' restrictions put on them. The. quality of 
reporting aio9n improved, and DuPont had no more complaintai to make. 
Foix wasi. tireleH in his efforts to perfect the attack en Charles-
ton and g~ve »~Pont everything he asked for to in$ure succeaie. The 
20Thempson and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Cor~e$pondence of 
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work of Fo~ did not go unmentioned. Admiral Foote, cotlllDanding the North 
MiHbsippi Squadromi and one cf the most :respe<eted men in the mavy, 
called him one of the mo$t able and far-sighted men in that branch of 
the service. DuPont, who was close,t to Fox in the months just before 
the attack on Charleston, was especially convinced of the great qualities 
in the man. Said the Admiral, 11The ship$! of my $Jquadron are in as high 
~onditi@n a$ I can expect and I am thankful to the Department for its 
. endeavor$ t~ make it as efficient as possible, and t~ your practical, 
intelligent, and personal supervision and zeal I shall ®ver recur what-
21 
ever the results in store for 'ill5l may be. 11 The Admiral abo told Fox 
that the data he released regarding new defenses near Charlestol!1l was very 
helpful and boosted the morale of the blockading squadron. 
The need for deliberate and careful planning to insure success at 
Charleston was clear. Fox 0s confiience in the menitcrs and his promise 
to CongreH of Ch.1.rleeton by the next 1e1si~n had created great optimism 
in the c©>untry. If the ~ttack failed, the nation would feel let down, 
public opinion would swing against the navy, and it would be exceedingly 
hard to get money to build his dream, an iroincbd fleet. DuPent sensed 
hi® anxieties by remarking in a February, 1863 letteri 111 sympathize in 
$erve. The best way is not·to think too much of what will please it, 
d 22 but what b bie@t a!i!d what hi uty. '' 
The BrU:ish co\mrr,ul ta Waeh.ingten, D. c. stirred up a storm in Con-
gress when he told that body in May, 1862~ that armed troopships of the 
2lThcmp1on and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Corre1pondence !! 
G. V. !.2,!, I, ,64. 
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Confederacy.carrying munition11 of war had been allewed to go in and 
cut of Charle1ttl\»R with no attempt mt.de t,o stop them. This cau11ed tb..e 
Senate Committee on Naval Affairs to investigate the effectiveness of 
the blockade at Charleston. Welles and Fox vigorously defended DuPont 
and his movements. Fox charged that this was a deliberate attempt by 
the British to make the Unieu lift the blockade on the grounds that it 
was net effective, so they c~uld legalize their urmeutral acts favoring 
the.Confederacy. -Fox told the Committee that although only one out of 
eight bleckadea.r_unmers were being caught at Charleston, this did not 
tell the whlll>le story. Be said the blockade was much more effee::tive 
than the figures seemed to indicate because it prevented ms.my of the 
impo,tant, larger ships destined for Charleston from even attempting to 
enter the harb@r. 
Fox almest pulled a coup.!.!. gra~e in January of 1863, while still 
preparing for the attack on Charleston. He conceived of a tremeado~sly 
daring plan to eapture the powerful Confederate port of Wilmington en-
r(!))ute te (l:urlesto,n. Be had 'beem informed that yellow fever was raging 
in that city and that the defenders were exhausted and their trans-
. portation uncertain •. Fox immi,diately appointed Commo.dore Samuel Phill;Lps 
Lee, head of the Nertb. Atlantic Squ11.dron, to take t~ree ironclad1 (Pa•-. 
sic, Montauk, and the Monitcr).and capture Wilmington. The Confederate 
commander at Wilmington was painfully aware that h~ had nothing with 
which to stop the monitors. Fate, however, stepped in on his side. On 
Decemher 31, 1362, the Monitor, with twenty-six men abeard, sank off 
Cape Hatteras, and the bold Fox.plan had to be abandoned. 
As fall gave way to winter in 1862, Lincoln and the North became 
·.impatient.toward the repeated. deh.ys at Charleston. On.e factor causing 
'., ' ' 
the delays was the .indisp0sition of the war ,Department to cooperate 
with the XAavy. UIDltil the Cape Hatteli:a$ and Port Royal victories, it 
was not supp~$ed that the navy would take such a prominent part in the 
war • 
. Probably the chief reason for the delayai wa1 DuPont n s doubt re-
garding the power of _monitors against armed fortifications. Finally, 
on March 3, after much deliberation, DuWent determined he would test 
the effectiveneaJs 9f the menitors. Accordingly, en that day, the!!,!-
saic (Captain Drayten) 9 Patapsce (Captain Ammen), and Neh~n.t (Captain 
· Downes), attacked Fort McAllister in Georgia. Captain John Worden had 
made a lone venture against the fort in January with the monitor Mam-
tauk, and although he received little dam/age, he inflicted little upon 
the fertiei. The attack was n@t consi<dered to be a true test Qf the moni-
tors, because the Montauk was not as powerful offensively as the three 
monitors to be used against.Fort McAllister. 
The three ships were subjected to the fire of the forts f~r eight 
hours with~ut injury, but the smne was true of the fort. This attack 
should have ta~ght Fox a valuabl~ lesson by showing that, although the 
monitors were impregnable, they showed no correspending qlmality of 
destru.ctiveneH. ·Tb.e fifteen-inch turret gun advocated biy Fe:x and 
Dahlgren, alth.eugh pcwerf'liil, ,1h(ll)wed Sl!!llme glaring faults during the 
battle. It fired enly once every five minutH, and between times while 
the t~rret was tun:i.ing the enemy would wait until the port holes 
appeared and fire. After an eight heur fight in which the fort suffered· 
almost no damage, the three ships returned to' Chai.rlesten Harbor. Said 
DuPont about the att.acki "This experiment convinces me ••• that in all 
such cperatien1 to secure success, t:roGps are necess.ary.u23 Fox still 
23 
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remained unconvinced and thought Cha.rle&iten would be a different s.tory. 
He pleade4 with DuPont net te let the army spoil his plan. 
' The politica~ situation in the North made it imperative that the. 
attack on Cha.rltu1to,n ceme soon. The Seven Days Battle on the Yorktown 
Peninsula and the Second Battle of :Bull Run had lowered the Union 
spirit, and the people were adamant in their demand for positive action 
by the Republican administration. The people who had so lavishly sup-
ported the war were now disillusioned. Treasury ~otes depreciated, and 
in the fall election$ dhcontent .. was reflected as the Democrats won big 
g~:.tn.s. To help quiet criticism of the .adminbtration, Fox once again 
promised Congress Charleston by the time they reconvened. Said the 
Asshtant Secretary in a letter to DuP'(l?nt in December, 1862: ''The 
political condition of things renders it imperative that we should pos-
24--
sreu all the Se>uthem ports pc»Hi'ble.,'' · · · He hinted that the weak 
measures of the Republican a~ministra.tion were responsible for this 
situation. ~ont reminded Fox that he was blockading effectively seven 
ports, instea.i of the two that he was supposed tO.atl\d remarked that 
there·w&s a limit to how much one squadron could do. Appr~ximately a 
.\ 
month later Fex told DuPont why it was essential that he attack as soon 
as possible; nwinances, pGlitics, foreign. relations all seem t.(Q) ask for 
Charleston befere CongreH adjourns so ,H to shape legish.tion. 11 25 \ The 
hidden meaning in thb letter inferred that the AHhtant Secretary 
feared British recegnition of the Confederacy resulting from key losses 
suffered by Union armies and lack of Re>yal Navy confidence in tke Unien 
2·4:: 
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fleet and blockade. Future Congressional appropriations fer an iron-
clad u.vy also we~e paramount to. Fox. It was generally thought .in high 
naval circles at the time that if the Atlantic Coast blockai.de, partieu-
larly at Charleston, could be proved ineffective, England would recognize 
the Confederacy. Tl\e delays by DliliPc:mt made the British wonder if the 
Union Navy could be considered a threat in the event they should give 
recognition to the South. 
Despite the critical situation in United States diplomatic circles 
and the peril te Farragut on the Mississippi, where his wocd~n ships 
I 
were endangered by Confederate ironclads, DuPont still hesitated •. Even 
thGugh Fcx had given him every ironclad vessel available to the Union, 
thus making him as ready as he could ever be, the Admiral delayed posi-
tive act-ion. He still lacked ccm.fidence in the monitors and in the 
Oharlesten plan. This type of admir~lship aroused the ire of beth Presi-
dent,Line0ln and Secretary Welles, who lost canfidence in DuPo~t because 
of his delaying tactics. Just before the attack Lincoln told Welles: 
nThe long delay ef DuPont, his c01uitant calling for more ships and mGre 
ironclads, was like McClellan calling for more regiments. n26 He thought 
the two me~ were alike and prepared hi~elf for a repulse at Charleston~-
Welles~ ~is confide.nee waning, as the time for the battle. drew lti\ear, also 
feared a defeat and was.furious with the Admiral for his constant delaying. 
After the Cumberland and Congress had been disabled by the Merrimac 
on March 9, 1862, and the South had proclaimed the blockade broken, Fox 
remained calm. He did infer that Du.P.011.t shauld. hurry the attack, as 
the President was getting restive, suggesting that he was having a hard 
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in the Department wh~ still had confidence in D1U!P'ont and expected a 
victer:ry at Cn<i:rl®$lton. Advice given by Admiral Dahlgren, builder of 
the fifteen inch gun armd an expert on naval architecture, went un-
heeded by Fo:1:. Dahlgren told Fox that his previous impressions ef the 
monitors had been confirmed; that whatever degree of impenetrability 
they had was n~t matched by a cwrresponding qu~lity of aggressi~n er 
for gunboats .i~ the foiir;u to take shelter ill!!\ the bembpro~f ®. The 
A week before the attack, Fox wrote te monitor builder John Eric$-
son and told him that although everyone else was de$pondent a.bout 
doubt as to our succeSJs and tb.i.s confidem.ce arhes frem a study eif your 
In reply to this letter, Eric~~~n tried to de-
£late the Fox bubble of optimism. He stated that monitors had not be~n 
New Orlean$g 11 1£ yeu suc@eecd it will not be a mechanical conSJeiqtll,etnce of 
that prestige wl;lich your ironclads h,1.ve conferred en the nation a.bread 
.,29 
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Fox was di$mayed ~n February 16 whe~ he learned in a meeting with 
the Pre®ident, Secretary of War Stanton, General H. W. Halleck, &nd 
General John G. Fo®ter that DuPont wa~ considering abandoning the all-
navy plan in faw~~ Qf suppo~ting the army in a siege of Charleston. He 
learned of DuPont's change of mind through General Foster, who had just 
returned fr@m Charle1ton Harbor. According t~ Fo~ter, he and DuPont 
had meaeured J.ame, Is1£nd ~nd found it to~ wide to be covered by guni 
from the irone1.l®,i!..s, a:Hum.ing they could get to Cha:desiton. The plan 
they adwo©ated would have ~~~d ironclad$ to protect the army from Merri$ 
-!$land while they erected batterie$ to reduce S@mter. Fe~ wa~ enraged 
and i:mmediS1tely chili\llienged the army men t((JI tell him wh<l11t the re51ult 
would be if ir~n©lad@ reached a po£ition off the city. They ~11 re-
plied that this would mean the evacuati(ll)n of James Island. Foi::it then 
demanded t@I kn<!JJW why the f(Q)~ta\ W<OJu.ld have l;(()J be attacked. The army 
chiefs cOJuld give h::bn 1lll.<lll answer. Thiei AHbtant Secretary then twld the 
Preside1lll.t th~t if th~ n~wy could by-pa5\$ the fort1 and then rea©h the 
city, the purp@@e w~uld be accemp lbhed. If they could not lbiy-paH the 
forts~ then <!l1 wiege W(Q)uld be in order. The Pre®ident concurred. 
Fox, $Uppert:ed by the Fre$ident~ wanted to v;bit DuPont to Nke 
siure th® iQlt'igin.ml plGin W(Q)1llld be cai,n:ied out. Wre-11~$ :refu$Jed the re-
que®t be®iil.tll!Sle l!i'®>c!!: ha1d\ tow much werk in the Depa,rtment wa:i.ting for him 
and becau~e he fi?.lt th,1.t l[h:.tr'~ll1lt 0 ® p:ri~e w<llluld lbie h.u'lft by :such~: v:hd.t. 
Th.e AISlsbtal!llt Secretary did dispatch an urgent letter to DuPont tel~ing 
him of the evem:IM1 th<i!.t t®lok place at the me.eting, and which expreHed 
the h~pe th~t Ile would not be duped intl\lll a siege by the army. Although 
D\l:llFoint prote@ted in a return letter th<1!!.t his only purpose h<il,d been· te 
protect the <i\rmy while they tooik Mor:ir:bi JJ:$htnd, it was clear th~t the 
Admiral h~d be@n ph.nning to Wt!'.Jlrk with the <illrtny in a siege. It. was 
89 
G1Dlly the pre$Sure of Fox that had $topped him. 
On April 2 LincCllll:!'ll came t(l) the end l!!lif the line with DuPon.t. He 
doubted th~t the Admiral weuld ever attack Charlest0n, much leis cap-
ture it 9 &nd w&s in favor of sending Gener.al Hunter and all the ir«:>n-
clads directly to New Orleans, as the Mississippi was the principal area 
of operati@ns at th~t time and was being critically threatened by the 
Confederates. With considerable difficulty Fox restrained Lincoln from 
!!lending the b'enclai.ids to the ~iHhtSippii and thu$ breaking up hh pbn. 
Pont ordering him t~ $ena all his ironclads to New Orlean1 after th~ 
30 
attack, 11 ••• reserving for yourself only two." The wording of the 
letter was such as to direct criticism toward DuPont. F0x, trying 
the $Uppli~® come doWl'I!. the Red River, th&t stretch of the river ll!ml~t 
31 
be in (11\Jlt' p<l:ll®lil®S® i@ln. 11 
30 
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Sl\oiootei:r. Jit W<lil.® h<ell'.'® that a fa.t1a1l mistake waSl made by thte UIDlfon com-
m&1mi.dersi. !ml.®tcead IQ)f 2ttempt.ing t@ p1a1s® the forts ai@ Fo:it: lulld arih1iQlcatcedJ, 
the momitiQJlr®, @nee after anotheir, ®t@ppieid and tuirn~d at the @~$tl'.'u©.tiQJn:siJ, 
thus bre<9l.king t:!:u~ line <Cif att&J1.ck ~nd c1&u~ing them to huddle conf1llll!liedly 
at the ve:ry poililt where C:onfeden.te gun® were t·11nmed on thenm. In this 
po$itfon they were ilOl danger of st:riking bott(Q)m and himldering each 
other Os fire 9 plu~ lbieing e:J1:tremely w.lnierable to the C@irufederate gun!!!. 
Not being able t@ pLmce hb l!lhipsi pr@perly and with night appr@aching, 
JDuPwlffit withdrew firom the ha:rb<Olr at 4i 30l P .M., fully intendi1!llg to renew 
the att$!.ck o:n the £4:»llic»wing day. D\\llri1.mg tMt @amre evening, DuPont Os 
officer$ came om. b\QJa:ird the flag®hip and, after a two h©ur ©onfeirelll!.ce 
with the Admiiral~ decided it w@uld ~e utterly impractical to make an-
other attempt at Charle$t@n with the force at ha1llld. Although no ship 
h.~d been e;it;p@®ed tw em1,,emy fire f@ir m@re than fol!."ty minute~, five iron-
clad® were partially @r wh@lly di@abled» atte®ting tw the violence (Q)f 
the fire. ID\l.llF@nt w.1ui C<QJ1li1.winc.ed ~1Ji@ther attal(;;k olffi Charle®t@im w@uld rre= 
@uh in a @li®a®treir. 'Jr.he Admiral mentilQlned as ca1U\I®$\ (!If :hiil1lllre the 
@foW!lle®ai @f' th®. m0>nit@'If.~ 0 fire~ th® inability OJf hh ®«JJuavtl\1t,ilJ!lll to «;))C©:\Ulpiy 
l!llny lb1&tt~11y tht®Y 1l111light !5l:li.l.raim~rei.j tSJ'@id the imp0>il\l!dl.bility t0if ttSJ.king the 
outer fo'.it't® v Sl\lllmt®:r i&ll'l\@ Mwultlbie (whi@h h@ h.!ll.d h<illp(;>Ji!ii tJ:tt, .!lJ.lrm;f Q.@\Ulld tr&kre). 
The p@d:©Jrm:&lffie<e wf thie monit@)'/t'~ @111\ly partially j\Ul@tified lF@:it 0 ®i 
f,dth iin thre.m. ':1!:'h,d:r big di®,1Mhr1&l.ffit1&ge @ff@1m1Rliwrely W<Bl.SJ it'.h<&t th~y could 
fire ~111.\ly ((lil\'ll(i.le ft.V<eir::y five 1m:IJ.im\Ull!::H <dlui:e t01 ai. d(llw l!nO\'l'in.g tut'r(ilt, '!'heir 
offen$liVtei power w1S1rsi lll!.eve:r ll:'151&:ily tt';'li\t~d /S.!.g1.in1t the forts lbiecause JWo;J!( 0 t 
pbin wa1s 11'11<!llt ad,@cqt\llll&t®ly followed. H.a<d 1!:;hie; i:ronchlrdsi pl\Qlw1eirdl through the 
Clilb®truictiinin.@p wM.IQ:h F(Q)X h.ac& plt&;mn(e©. f@r 111iY building iiron rl!llft~, a11d 
,~tttSimpte<d to :r.unm the forts inste$1.d of ieng$lii:ng them u!llder th.re m0>$lt \U\!ll-
fsi.wot'~lb>l® 1:d:c,Jl:1lll:m~tlSlll'I\C<Hl~ {&ll hiMidli!d t:@geth(t'Jl' near thre o\bl1tr1;llc.tion®) 
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the chances for success would have been greatly increased. Defensively, 
the performance IOlf the ironcl<1ll.ds e:;gceeded even Fox 0 s expectations. 
Against the heaviest ordnance ever thrown against any ships, and at 
short range, the ironclSJ.ds suffeired little dmnage as compared with the 
To Henry Villard, a correspondence with the New York Tribune, who 
credit that he chose not to renew the attack. Choosing between the 
listen to the dictates of reason rather than follow the impulses of 
3"' rash daring. 01 · .e; 
In retrospect~ the attack on Charleston was deemed to failure from 
miracle for a h@$tile fleet to reach the city. The lack of knowledge 
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them almo$Jt .sit will. 
When the As@i®tant Secretary received a letter from General Daniel 
Butterfield on April 10 9 steJ.ting th/lll.t the Keokuk had been sunk and that 
the attei.ck had been a failure, he refused to believe it or even give 
the information to the p~blic. Fo~ could not believe that after all 
for tw(Q) yeS1r$, while the iil/lll.WJT fbgwtaff with. its gilded eaglE womJd waiit 
33 in val.in t.o fling the l'®/lll.nllllelf (O)f vlt~t@lfy. ?be f/lll.ilure of the Charles-
Davbg 11 1 have beien 47 ye.ars in 1t:J1e ll'ilawy. My im8l.1M.e is identified with 
11 'i., ')'l) . . h ?1134 my country •• Qwhile whet'e wi Fo:it we in "'"" m@lrllt s, ... 
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Cha~ges an~ counte~~h~rgew flew after the f~ilure at Ch~rleston as 
to who was re®p~n$ible for the n~wy 0s defe~t. The Navy Department blamed 
subpoened to testify before a Sen~te inwe~tigating committee checking 
who was too old and too timid to @mnbine the monitors 0 defensive strength 
and the wooden shipw 0 fire power i&nd m.mll.euverability to hi$ advantage. 
He W2$ afraid to speak his mind against a p~rely naval attack for fear 
Departm®nt for not stating ~eforeh~n~ how me~ger the chances for~ suc-
cess at Charleston really were. The f~ct was that the whole Navy De-
partment, ~speci~lly Fox, m;i.d the Northern pu~lic had so high an opinion 
of the monit~r$ th1&t they believed Charleston would be con@RUel.!:'ed immedi-
ately. 
Pont. B\@wewcar 9 the AHi&llt~nt Se~l.!:'®t1&lry believed th1&t he wa$ giving DUt-
Pont t~e key$ te Ch1&rle$t~n wh~ he g1&ve him \U\ntested 1M>nitor1 in whicn 
chaiuie foir &n amphilb>im.ll~ h!.niding bn f.mv@r ®lf a n.&val ''glery" attack, to 
S!pite the SJ.~y\, f1&ilb.g to h@®d »llllP~imt O ~ pre~·1&tt1&ck rep~:rts. He $hl!il)uld 
monitor$ 0 shor:tcomi~g$, and the $qu&dron°~ deterioration. 
. ~ . 
Fox knew about al!ld could have 1lllle, the ID&hlgren plan (a @~-~rdi-
n.m_ted ai.mpihill»iouie, anny-n1&vy a tt.mck} , ~\Ult chQ/$e not to. Why w1&s it not 
tried? The iq\\l\e~ti@n i.;i easiily 1&n~weired. Frwx w&® sio impr:eHed with the 
,ower of the 1l00lnitoir!l!I that 1:he 1U1lfg11r.rd\ lDJ1lllJ/ll!il)nt t«l> !lM.ke a gr:a1mid st:roke'· ilt the 
fir®t t:rh1l of thHe V(H!/8l®b. Thiei .AH:hltitlnlt S:ecret~ry must t.!lke the 
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wanted t@ imp>re!'!l~ Ultllion naval might upon the English and French governments 
who were seeking a favorable excuse to ~ecognize the Confederacy. At 
the same time, it wculd have been a great triumph for the navy t@ con-
finally catching up with him. It was having a daring Farragut at New 
Pont 0 s argumeimt th.at it was unsafe for Union blocbden to lie within 
the Oha.rlest:@n Ear am.d blo,ckade it effectively. This w,u shown later 
the bar without any difficulty or danger. This change in Union block-
sent a harsh lll\lOJte to the Adlllliral ordering him to hold hbl position il!11-
side the Charleston Bar and not to leave it. The Presidelll\t sarcasticly 
told DuPont that he might attack if he so desired. The next day Lin-
coln cooled oiff and telegraphed the Admir.ml that he had meant llll<> 
ce~sure. The d~111W!.ge had, howeve:r, been done. On April 16 DuPont 
., 
asked Welles to show no hesitatiolll\ in removing him for an officer, 
service in which I have had the misfortune to fail -- the capture of 
Thus ended the fillll.&l ch&pt'e,; in a pb:n gone awry. 
3'»llllP'ont, Re&r Admiral S. F. DuFwnt, 283-284. 
DuPonTht was repl~ce;rd biy Admir<ffil Andrew Foote en June 3~ and when that 
elderly officer ®uddenly died, Admiral Dahlgren a$sumed comnmnd. 
F~x remained convinced that his plan could h<ffive been carried out 
$Ucce~®fully .if he had had a cemman.der with couragej daring, and confi-
dence to lead it. After Dahlgren became head of the South Atlantic 
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Blci,ck.ti!.ding Squadri:m, the Assistant Secretary tried repeatedly to get the ane 
ID81,ri1 who met those qus.lificatforns, Darvid Farragut, but without succeS)SJ. 
Despite the fact that Dahlgren failed in his attempts to take Ch.ffirleston 
in 1863=64, and the city remained iml C(Q)nfederate h$1.nds tot.he end wf:,the 
,' 
war, Fox wa® never convinced that hi~ ma~ter stroke could not have worked. 
Event~ ~fter the removal of DuPont~$ head @f the South Atlanti~ 
Blockading Squ~dircn proved th~t the Admir~l had been right in hi~ teiti= 
mony that Ch&ll.rle.1Ston could not be taken by a purely nai.val attack, The 
event$ of the next two years proved thi$ view. N(O) ship of the navy 
fire ®ilenced, asnd the batteries oif Mor:d:!B bland in Union posses~ion. 
The harbor wa® ai, circle of fire !llot to be paHed. ~-S.ep-tenibe:ir:.:'~863-::::i_co-= 
the theai.ter of w~r, and ai, knowledge of the direction i!ll which it$ forces 
were swe~ping, m!llde it evident that the occupation of Charleston was 
worth little as far a1 a military wbjective w:as concerned. With this in 
mind, Fo:J!: (lrridered the Gh.irlHton h:arbicr effectively sealed by veSJseh 
re~ining illllside the bar :a~d Fort Sumter reduced. If Confeder~te forces 
could be h<eld in Charleston in defellll/S\6 of the dty, instead cf rein-
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The f.ailure ef Dahlgren to c.eipture C:harlest~n indicated that DuPont 
had been right in Gpposing a purely naval attack. Although Dahlgren did 
$&fely remain inside the bar (which DuPont said could not be done), he 
hilll$elf wecame convinced that it was folly to think Ch£rleston could be 
captured by·a purely naval venture and he was not sure that even a com-
bined force could take it. Soon after he had assumed command and had 
se~m. wb..!!1.t he wa1 up against, Dahlgren tried to cool Fox 1 s confidence and 
his demand for a victory at Charleston. In reply to an impatient Fox 
letter,· he H.idi "But my dear Fox, ylt1lu must modify that condition of 
succes~ as indhlp<en$.able. No man with l!i\ew elements in c©>nflict can pro-
. 36'•. 
mi$e to be successful." 
Fo~ was often criticized after the war for not using the same method 
of attack to t&ke Charleston that was used te' force the surrender of 
Fort Pulaski one mi~nth earlier. 
effort to the joint attack$ of Gener~l Thom.ei.s w. She:nnan and Admiral 
DuPont. The military contingelilt had been adeqU.t.te, and the plans pur-
sued were based on sou.nd stra.t,gic principles. The Assistant Secretary, 
be reduced; run~ing by them would h~v~ been sufficient to f~rce the 
surrender Gf the city. As a result, he never seriously considered the 
Pulaski plan, p:referring to rdy on the principleis of naval war.fa~e th,t 
he had used so effe~tively at New O~leans a year earlier •. Tbius Charles-
ton remained as a powerful symbol of Con.federate strength tc the. end ef 
the war. The prci~.1d, South Carolina city :fin.ally fell on February 18, 
1865 t0 General William Sherman returning from his march t~ the sea. 
The 1ig1mific1&nce of the Uniorn attack on Charleston is noteworthy. 
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As ··a result, it was found that blockading vessels could remain safely 
inside the bar in Charleston Harbor, thus making the blockade much more 
effective. Without such a blockade, the Confederate armies would have 
been abundantly supplied with the best European war material in ex-
change for cotton. Their fighting power in the field would thus have 
been greatly augmented. The great ironclad fleet that attacked Charles~ 
ton, even though it failed, showed enough strength so as to discourage 
any final notions the French and British may have entertained of sup-
porting the Cenfederacy. Fox-must get Dl0St of the credit for this· re-
sult, because he was the driving force behind the massive ironclad 
building program undertaken. Even though failure after failure followed 
the attempts to take Charleston, l degree of satisfaction was evident in 
the North. At least attempts were being made to captur~ the hotbed of 
secession, and the blockade was being drawn ever tighter. With the con-
stant naval pressure bein.g-inse~ted upon Charleston the Confe4erates 
were forced to ke~p badly needed troops in the city to protect it. The 
eesire fer Charleston by the Union and especially by Fox led to the 
building of an irc»nclad fleet in the N~rth. Tb.is fleet not" only gave 
the Union an a4vantage over the Confederacy, but it also discouraged 
friendly relations ~etween the Seuth and foreign nations. 
\ .·, 
The historian of the Confederate Navy was probably not exaggerat• \\. 
in,g··w-h~n· he d:ecfar.elh "In all the history af the war upon the seahoard, 
the aperations around Charleston easily take first place. The progress 
of the siege ••• ,the naval experiments in the opposition of fo~ts to iron-
clad fleets, the development of heavy ordnance, the evolution of torpedo 
warfare in these waters, were studied with the most profound interest by 
3·7 ·. 
the civilized w@rlci. 11 · '. 
··,:37 
·Jeseph Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1954), 258.· 
The Fox plan for Charleston had failed, to be sure, but as a re-
sult of the failure the blockade had been tightened. From then on, 
traffic te Charleston tras almost at an. end, and the credit of the Con-
federate States H.nk ti® a new lew. Thenceforth, the Confederacy weuld 
have to depend en scanty supplies at home, and their downfall was con-
sidered as only a matter of time. 
CHAPTER V 
FOX THE ADMINISTRATOR 
Not only did the navy at the outset of the Civil War lack both the 
vess,.ls and men imperatively needed, but worse still, there was in washing-
ton no orgamization su,ch as a general naval staff, nor even any particular . 
I 
person able to deal with the numberless problems which arose in that area. 
These problems were to allot to each commander the required force for t~e, 
work assigned him; to decide which of these tasks was paramount for the 
moment; to maintain the provision of vessels, officers, and enlisted per-
sonmel; to keep up the flow of supplies in ammunition, fuel, and food; 
and last, but greatest of .all, to survey the whole military and naval 
field and map out, in harmony with the military authorities, a general 
plan covering many minor campaigns, all moving toward the eo1lll1l0n end, the 
defeat ef the enemy. The emergency of the mement antedated the establish-
ment of a war college which would have provided a body of men who had 
studied the art of war in its iarger phases. Hence a planning section, 
to prepare a general e·cheme for waging naval wa~are and to work out its 
details, was nenmexistent. It was for the purpose of handling these 
pro~leme that · ~he office of Assistant Secretat:'Y of the Navy was e1reated 
.: .. 
by'President Lineoln and Fox selected fer the post. After August 1, 
1861, Fox w~11· \responsible for practically all of the naval planning and 
action during the Civil War. 
Secretary Welles, at the start of the war, had realized the necessity 
of having an adviser.in his ~epartment who could take charge of .the 
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practical side of naval affairs and who, by hi$ knowledge of the miavy 0 s 
wants, could assist him to meet the overpoweriThg difficulties that were 
piling up. Not until Fo~ WSJ.!Sl appointed Asi:d.stant Secretary wu atten-
tion paid to building ironclads a'liild othe:r veHeb neces$ary for iaoast 
and river service.1 
Fox brought into the Navy Department a knowledge of naval matters 
which could miot by any p@Hibility h.mve been attained by a man of purely 
civilian e:Eperience. His eighteen years as a ~a.val officer had given 
him a gr@at advantage. Though perhaps he did n@t have the pre~tige that 
would h~ve be®n held by a board of admirals, the success of the ~avy 
during th~ war and its rapid i!'l!.crease i!'l!. numberSJ and efffoiency 5lhowed 
that he wa131 al:i.ve to all the requirements. 
The Navy Department was in a state of mass confusion when Fox 
assumed his duties on August 1, 1861. The April proclamati~n by Presi-
dent Linceln decl~ring all Confederate ports under blockade ~aught the 
Navy Department toitally umprepared for 5luch a contingency. The canfulslion 
.b.cident to a ichange of admin:$tratiorns was heightened many-fold lbiy 
:rel!llignat.ion$ of many Southern officersi due t<Ql the seceufon of their 
$tatel!ll and the re®ulting outbreak of hostilitiei. These resignationSJ, 
besides created a feeling of uncertainty and distrust, had disorganized 
the Department and Administirai.t.iom. for some time. Cie»ngress had adjourned 
in March without pr@viding fer the navy, and it was up to Welles and Fox 
te meet the situation as best they could. Foix, as Assistant: Secretary, 
assumed supervisien of all the navy bureaus and took charge of all p:ro-
fe.!llden.ail and naval ma.ttters. It was hh responsibility to supervise the 
outfitting, annament, and operations of naval vessels and plans plus the 
lp~rter, Naval History~!!:!! Civil War, 355. 
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(1) .All th@ port® ailong the Southern Cosu~t had to be closed under the 
mo$t e%~cting regulatirQJn~ ef intern~tio~al law, including th~ 0ccupation 
of the Potomac River _from its mouth to the federal capital. Had the 
Potomac been blocked by enemy gun:s at any time during the war, the p(l)l6/i-
necesndty CJf e~tablhhing an effeictive oirganizaticm of combined naval 
Confederai.tei crui8lie:r$ which might elude the blockading force ef the 
FiQJX aicc~mplished much of thi$l before the war was 
much mwre than aJ. Y®~r old, H b sb.oWlill by the fact that by mid-1862 the 
the war whi~h cetdd be relied up@1Di f1;»r bloicka.ding service, and none were 
suitable for the pursuit of Confederate cruiiers. Fo~ wasted n~ time in 
purchased othen for temporary !llervice from the _merchant nw:rine. Because 
of the resignation@ ef many ~®val effi~ers, a scarcity of commanders re-
sulted which F@x .hu:rriedly oorreiated by pushing a bill through a~ngress, 
. 2 . 
B\oynt@in, Hisltor_y of !h! ~During-~ Rebellion, I., 62, 
3 :eoir.tie:r, Na~',i;J.l f!htory l!))f ~ Civil !i!!., 33. 
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chant marine if they could p£S$ qu,!ll.lifying ex.aJmination®. 
cer@ thlrough e®t,!ll.blbhment of gunnery and naval training scheoh at 
Fox mu®t receive much credit for improving the ~dminhtratlon of 
the navy. Befere he towk office there wa,$ little hepe for promotion by 
any yoWl!g offieer® becau1e of the ®eni©lrity 1ysitem then in effect. Ai 
ment. J!'<C):tK: him$elf h®.d left the n&wy in, 1856 for tb.~t very reasen. To 
for promotion which did much to elevate the ®erviee and retire these 
who, from £g@ or other diwability~ were no longer fit for active duty. 
Thi® acti@n by F©lx was the finit gleam 0f h())pe .. iill a half ceintury for a 
by the ASJ$i:sltant Secretary, adding three grade$ to the number then in 
~1· 
· J.ll@lrt.er, Naval Hhtory of t:he Ci.vi 1 ~' 37. 
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In May, 1862, Fox asked Senator William Grimes of Iowa .to include 
in his n{lval appreP,ria.tions .bill a provision calling for the abolition 
of rum. The law forbad~ distilled liquors, except for medical purposes, 
tq be on beard ship. "All insubordination, all misery," said Fex, 
"every deviltry en board ships can be traced to rum.n 5 
Fox ccmm.ented on the' dirrection of his efforts in the Navy Depart-
·· ment at this time: "I have endeavored in this war to preserve the. 
organization ef the navy and te carve out work fer it which should be 
purely naval, depending entirely upon the power of its ordnance, the 
skill of its officers, and the courage of its sailors •• ~~we have won .t.!lld 
. ) . .. . . ~-. 
,, 
now must take advantage .ef it to place the navy,~n~ the school Licademz.7 
on a sound basis to meet the requirements of th_e tim.es. "~ 
Fox 0s term as Assistant Secretary was characterized by his daring 
and erigimality. Never afraid or unwilling to try something new, his 
boldness and cc!)lceptions regarding new methods of naval warfare, and the 
courage with which he defended and helped introduce these inventions, 
stood Gut and commanded the attention of the Yerld. He completely 
accepted the idea of the irenelads and spoke in their defense to Congress 
tc get appropriatiellll.s fer building them. It is Fox wbci, gets the credit 
fer bringing into use the fifteen inch Dahlgren gun, without which the 
monitor would have lost much importance. 
rcx 0e courage and daring have already been e1t&bli1hed. Hi• expedi-
tion to relieve Fort Sumter before the war, against everwhelming odds 
and. extreme danae.r; his choice of a then unknown naval captain named 
5 Thompson and Wainwright, (eds.), Confidential Correspondence!! 
_g,. !• !'.!.!, II, 304 • 
. 6 
" I°'id~, 302-303. ,_ 
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David F2rragut te command the vital New Orlean$ naval camp~ign; the New 
O:deans plan it~elf, which resiulted in that dtyu~ capture when aill the 
ia,rmy and ID@l$lt ~f. the navy we:nte saying it ic:culdn I t lbie done; the attempt 
to capture Charle~ton with a fleet of untested ironclads -- all were 
planned and carried out by a man whe knew little fear and had enough confi-
dence in him$elf to chance things that might have resulted in complete 
di$aster, It i® ~o coiTocide~ce th~t many of the~e daring maneuvers by 
F@~ were succe~$ful lb®cau~e the South was taken by surprise. This was 
e~pecially true at New Orleans, 
Typical 0f Fo:lt: 0 s daring was the pl.mn he and General Butler con= 
cocked in 1864 to ~apture Fort Fisher, North Carolina, after Mobile had 
fallen and the Missiiuippi was SJafe, Both men thought th1&t a ship with 
a large qual!iltity of powder could be pushed so near the fort that an ex-
plGsion w~uld not only level its wall~ but perhaps detonate the maga-
7 -
zine, On the night of December 24~ 1864~ (with General Butler 
anchored sixty miles away to avoid debris from the explosion) a steamer 
dis:guiSled as a blockade runner, was pushed next to the fort and set afire. 
The tremendous explasii@n anticipated never ic.mme, Th<e bl~fSlt did very 
little dainagie .te the fort, without any satbl:IEactory e~planatien, 
The Assistant Siecreti&:ty w,ui at Fort Monroe, off Hampton Rr!llads, on 
March 9, 1862, alfud witnes:<llied the Merrimac-Monitor battle. As he n0ticed 
that the sh@t from the MonitoJC gla.ncied off the sloping sidei. af t.he 
Merrimac, he wondered why no one had ever thought ef casting larger guns 
with heavier sihet that would knack in the :slide of a ship with the £int 
j;;':':;·, 
bro~dside, ... Befere leaving the fort he Slaw the then untested and 
1 Bwyllllton., Hhtory cf ~. Navy During the Rebellion, II, 570. 
8 Fo:rt®r, JN/~~1~1 Hhtory of ~ Civil War, 362. 
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u111Lu1ed fifteen inch Dahlgren gun lying on the d0ck, When he returned 
te Wa1hingtG»n he received Welle!!.!il O approva'l te hil.ve tu,rr"et$ made big 
enreugh fer the mammo.th fifteen inch.er, Thu$ it was that fifteen inch 
guns came into cemmen us~ge en menit~r$ during the Civil War. 
Fox-shewed feresight in directing the building of the ironclads. 
He insisted that they ~e small enough (a ten feet draft at the mest) 
t@ allow them te pais thr~ugh the most narrew and tor~ueus streams, where 
if they lacked room to turn, they could go out again» stertt foremost. 
It .was Fex who ahlo suggested building tha$e large ships of war, over 
3,000 tons, that could make seventeen and a half knots-·fc>r twenty-four 
c0nsecutive hours»· the greate~t speed ever attained 'by a naval power at 
that time. 
After the fall of the Norfolk Navy Yard to the Confederacy and subse-
quen.t capture ef the·ironclad Merrimac in April, 1861, Fo:1: realized the 
gre.at threat ~f the Confede-:rate Navy ta the Nerth. He knew the Confeder-
ate Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, had staked the success of 
his in.avy en two well-conceived projects~ (1) the creatian ef commerce 
destroyer~ like the Alabama, and (2) the construc·tion of ironciads simi-
lar to the Merrimac,. to break the blockade and carry the f,igh-t ta> the 
9 
enemy. Tb.e Ar1udsitant Secretary, therefore, was eager very early in 
the war t<i> embark upon the construction 0f i.ronclads. One other factor 
entered into Fo~ 0 s zeal to build an ironclad fleet immediately. He felt 
sure that unless he could show England and France that the Union possessed 
a powerful naval force and blockade, recogniti~.n. of the Cenfederacy by 
these twe countries would u0n be forthcaming. 10 
9James P. Baxter III, Intr0duction of the Ironclad Warship, (C~m~ 
bridgei Harvard University Press, 1933), 237;~ 
10n»id. 
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The As~i$tant Secret~ry f~ught ~lone for ironclads at the start of 
the war, 
men scoffed at them a,51 11 £reaksi11 0 The French Navy h~d only a few iron-
clads, while English naval officers laughed at the idea of an ironclad 
fleet, Most Congressmen agreed with the Engli$h naval heads and thought 
the ironclad$ would go down in the first gale of wind. With all this 
opposition ag~inst him, Fox nevertheless $ecretly asked John Laird, 
E~gland 0 s fam@u~ builder of ramSl, to submit bids for ironclads, 11 
- . 
Wepes later de:rnied th~t Ldrd. h£j],d been swkied to subl)nit bids, stating 
that no per$on h~d been authorized to apply to Laird or any other foreign 
shipbuilder to build vessels for the Union, and that when foreign agents 
had applied for a cont~act they had ~een refused. Welles undoubtedly 
spoke the truth, but Fox 0 s unpublished papers show that he was the man 
who a®ked Laird to sulbmit bids, fearing that the Union would need the 
.--.12 ir@nchids very soon~-
Attempts by Fox early in the w~r to start building monitors were 
stymied, Johll!. Lienmthall, chief naval architect and one of the best in the 
world, was opposed to all ironclads, A lbo~rd of officer@ established by 
Congress in May @f 1861 to investigate the feasibility of building moni-
ton only recomme.nded building veHehl th!lllt could be guaranteed a success 
by their lbu:i:ldein, Eve1lli after the Merrimac=Mcmitor affair, the board 
offered only to S.$Jk Co1mgress at the following SJ1(l)Hion for $10,000 for 
experiments on different iron plste1, as if the government could w~it. 
Led ~y Senator John Hale of New Hamp1hire and Co~gressm~n Henry Wi~ter 
11JamefSI P. Baxter III, Iirut:roductioin of the Ironclad WarshipD (Cam-
bridge~ Harv.mrd University Pre.H, 1933}, 27L--
1~1bid, 
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Davis of Maryland, Congreis opposed the building of ironclads as not 
being feasible. 
Fox was in~trumental in g~tting the fir$t bill ever passed by Congress 
for the construction of an ironclad fleet. The panic created by. the M~rri-
mac on March 9, 1862, induced Congress to pass a bill authorizing the 
Secretary of Navy 11 to cause to ~e constructed by contract or othert?ise, 
as he shall deem be®t for the publi~ interest, not exceeding twenty iron= 
clad steam gunboats", and appropri~ted $10,000,000 to that end. 13 Fox's 
promise of Ch~rleston to Congress in return for the appropriation proved 
to be an important f~~tcr i~ the billvs passage. 
The A~@bt~nt Secretary, with John Eri«;!Hon, opposied the European 
Slhip plan ©alling for an i'i.11.creasie in the lrllumber and penetra.ting power of 
~mall gunsi with enlarged $hip$ to carry them. The two men instead choose 
for th® attack, the SmsJ.$hing power of the heavy shot and for the defen$e, 
14 
a small surface of ilCllwb11erable power, The revolving turr~t, which 
could be turn®d anywhere ~or firing, wa$ hel~ to be a great advantage by 
Fox, 
Asi thingis turlt1!.ed out~ Fox 0 s agitation for the Monitor in .ll)ecember, 
1861, came just in time to HJ.Ve the day for the North three tnQnths ~ater, 
whe~ the Monitor contained the Merrimac off Hampton Roads. The signifi-
cance of the battle hi noteworthy, If the North had not had a monitor 
to check the Me:rri'illli&c, the bl~,ckade would have been destroyed and quite 
conceivably the South would have received British and French recognition. 
After the failure of the ironclads to take Charlesiton in April of 
13:aaxter, I1.mtrcduiotfo·l!!l !f ~ Ironclad Warship, 281. 
1
·
4Boymiton, Hhtory of ~ Navy During ~ Rebellion, I, 16ml7. 
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1863, Senator Hal~ u~leashed a barrage of criticism upon Fox, who had 
earlier promi$®d Charle®ton to Congress. Hale called him the real head 
of the Department {which, in many ways, he wa~) and said that Gideon 
'k, 15 Welles wcSJ.s actually ''pure and honest/'\lb>ut mhguided. 
Although Fo:1: wanted an ironclad fleet to contain and even.tually de-
feat the secessionists, he was looking ahead to bigger game. As soon as 
the Assistant ~ecretary became convinced of Engla~~ 1 s intentions toward 
the Confederacy, he determined to build a fleet of crui$ers of the 
Ammono!Olsuck cla$S to be able t!Ol meet her abroad as well as at home. Ui, 
He did his _job well. At the end of the war thirty steamers were com-
plet~d, rivaling England for control of the waters. Reported Captain 
William Horton of the Royal Navy to the Duke of Somerset on January 15, 
1865~ nB11.llt I have more particularly been led to consider •.. the ships 
which have latterly been c.~nstructed in America and which are eminently 
c~lculat~d to cut up and destroy our commerce in event of hostilities. 
The floating wealth of thi$ nation ••• could not with the naval resources 
we new possess, be protected in any degree against depredations of such 
cruisers as now form a promin~nt ~eature in the navy of the United 
17 States, n· 
Fox 0s role in the establishment of the i~onclad fleet for the Union 
waSl significant. That Ericsson deserves the credit ~or the o~iginal 
monitor idea_, n_l!j) one will deny; but ne:1:t to ErieHon, the As1hltant 
Secreta:i:·y of the Navy did more than anyone else to improive the iciea and 
a.pply it to naval warfare. It was a matter which the Navy Department 
15 West, Gideon-Welles, Lincoln 1 s.!!.!!l Department, 311. 
16 ioiynton, History.f! the~ During l!!!, Rebellion, I, 63. 
D'!bid. 
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had to handle eautiC\)usly, for though the M~nitor had demonstrated her 
,superiority ove~ the Merrimac, the plan was mot altogether acceptable 
to the majority of naval officers. I~ was only when a1:1Xiety wa~ f~lt 
lest we might be involved in a war with Fr&flce or England that patriotic 
,· 
feelings got the upper hand, and Congre.ss came forward to vote ~he nee,s-
sa~,y money for the ·~ni.tors. 18 
In ·few f!aees. in the history_ of our country has there·been a finer 
in.stance of ivteamwork" in govern.inent tha_n that which ·took p~ace between 
Welles· and Fox during the Civil War. It·was a rate combination.of talents. 
Welles, with his_i~timate knowledge of political matters and strong but 
unobtrusive personality, his readineH to accept advice from competent 
sources, took upon himself the control of legislative concerns and worthi-
ly represented the navy in the cabinet and to the nation; Fox, under the 
dire@ti(l)tll of Welles, regulated those things which were.purely technical 
. and mili,tary in their nature. Fox secured the eonfi4~nce of his chief 
very early in the war after the failure of the Fort Sumter expedition. 
That Welles tr-usted hill AHistant Secr·e~ary completely -iil th.e ··most iui-
1" .. , ' 
portant naval decisiens can lbe seen by F'oxns plan of action being adopted 
for New Orleans and Charleston by the Secretary, who also came to agree 
with his effor:tl to build up an ironcb.d. fleet. 
The Assistant Secretary was almost an exact opposite of Welles in 
personality. He was aggressive, but also tactful and persuasive. He 
was possessed of amazing enez:gy and endowed with a lively sense of humor; 
he was fond of people, fond of working, and full of ambition. Unlike 
Welles, Fllillx was .unable _to sit long at his desk. He frequently observed 
battles and checked upon the building of Union s~ips an~ ordnance. The 
18.eorter, Naval History £!! the Civil War, 362. 
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able extrovert and optimi®t, 
Welle$ became annoyed at Fox for occasionally signing his name to 
. . 
naval orden, thus creating the impression that they originated with 
him.. However, ''these were little weaknesses, and I permit it to give me 
no annoyance;" said the Navy Secretary. 19 Welles often stated that 
Senator H~le of New Hampshire and Representative Davis of Maryland, two 
foes of the Admin.i1tration, had tried many .times to create the impres-
$ion that Fox was the actual head of th~ Department,- in order to cause 
diHenl'!liCtll. bietween them, 'but to no avail. The· truth was t_hat· ·Fox, a 
large man ment&lly and physically, made an impression o'n vhi'tors 'and 
became so indhpensible tlOl the pep.t.rtment that Welle~ c~u-ld ~ot help 
being a little envious. 20 
When Fox retired a$ Auistant Slecretary in May of 1866, Welles; who 
wtth all his irritability and querulousn~ss, said: 111 regret to lose him 
from the JDepartmelrilt where ••• he is of almost invaluable service and has 
in him a great amount of labor. He has a combination of nautical intelli-
gence and coDIIOOin sen$e, such as can hardly be fou~d in another and we have 
worked together with entire harmony, never in a single instance having had 
21 
a misundierstanding ••• hh place I can.not make good in some respects." 
When the Civil War ended, Fox realized that there was little more 
for -him to accomplhh in Washington. On Jaimuary 17 ,- 1866, he informed 
Welles that he had been offered the presidency of the new steamboat line 
about to he established between New York and San Francisco. An0ther 
19 Fuess, "Gustavus Vasa Fox," Phillips Bulletin, XXI, 12. 
2,0:rtbi:i.d. 
21:cbid. 
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honor, hGwewer, was in store for him. On April 16, 1866, the life of 
Alexander II, Czar of Russia, w.sis save<d from the attack of an assaHi.in, 
and on May 16, Pre1iden.t Andrew Joh"nson. signed a Congressional Resolution 
expressing the satisfaction of the American people at his escape. The 
President selected Fox as the bearer of the congratulatory resolution. 
The crossing of the Atlantic to present the message would be made in the 
monitor M~antonomoh. It seemed like a good time to test the monitor in 
open water, and it was omly fitting that Fox should deliver the message 
in one of them, sin~e he had earlier declared that the ironclads were 
perfectly safe at sea. The trip by Fox to Europe was taken only partly 
to congr11.tulate the Czar on his escape; its chie.f purpose actually was 
to show in Europe the £lag of reunited America and to convey a solemn 
warming to potential enemies that the United States was conscious of her 
22 
rights on the high seas. 
Welles made the following entry in his diary for May 12,· 1866, re-
gardtng Fox 0s proposed trip: "Fox h bewildered with the idea of going 
out in. his official capacity as Assistant Secretary of the Navy to Europe. 
I am sorry to sees~ much .self-g1orification. But he is stimulated by 
23 Seward, Grimes, and others.n· 
Fox formally 1.C'Higned as AHhtant Secretary of the Navy on May 22., 
1866, and on the following day called on Welles at his home to say fare-
well. Both men were much affected, and the unsentimental Welles made 
this entry: "He has been useful to the coon.try and to me, reHeving me 
. of many labors and defending me, I bel,ieve, alw,ys. His manner and ways 
have sometimes ,given offense to others, 'but he is patriotic and true, ,,24 
22 West, Gideon Welles, Li~ooln°s Navy Department, 325. 
23 Fuess, "Gustavus Vasa Fox," Phillips Bulletin, XXI, 14. 
241bid. 
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On May 31, when he w,11u1 on hh way to Newfoundland, Fox was reappiointed 
as Auistant Secretary, and thus went to Ruuia in an offici-al capaci.ty. 
The enemies of Foxu$ ironclads and those who associated his name 
with them, as the man responsible for their introduction, rejoiced and 
sneered when it was announced he was to go to Europe·in the Miant~nomoh . 
.. They said it would be a fitting end for the man who had introduced the 
niron coiffins" into the navy to go down and be buried with one at the 
b~ttom of the ocean. 25 
Fox had particularly requested that he be allowed to take passage 
across the Atlantic in the Miantonomoh in order to demonstrate that this 
type of vessel was seaworthy. Welles, jealous of the attantion the 
Assistant Secretary was receiving, ac~used Fox of trying to obtain 
"useful celebrity" by making the first trip across the Atlantic in a 
216., 
monitor. The Mianto~omoh left St. Joh~ 0s, New York on June 5 and 
arrived il~fely in Queenstown, England on June 15, after a passage of ten 
days and eight~en hours, thus setting the question for all time as to 
whether a monitor would cross the Atlantic and fight rough seas. The 
. ' 
monitor c.rreateid a mild ®l!!lli'll&.tion at001ng Brithlh naval offi~er1. In fact, 
wherever the V:~Hel dropped anchor the little ironclad was the object of 
curi@d r;y. 27 
The Fo~ expiedition wa1 received moet graciously everywhere it 
stopped, especially in Russia, where the Czar gave a grand ban~uet and 
the members were feted almost continuously from the moment of their 
25Boynton, History of the~ During!!!! ~ebellion, I, 64. 
26 fuesis, "Gustavus Vasa Fox," Phillip~ Bulletin, XXI, 14. 
21 Ibid. 
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arrival until thei~ departure, The friendly feeling di®played between 
the tw()) countirie® at thb time undoubtedly w.si.iIB largely respon.dble for 
Russi~ 0 1ll offer in 1867, to ®Jl!!:11 Russian America, or Al.t.~ka, tl('J) the United 
State®, On De«::embier 13, 1866, Fox returned from Europe, and e~rly the 
following year reported to Secretary Seward the gifts and distinctions 
besitowed --upcm him during his journey, He then retired from office and 
settled down in Lowell, 
There he $GOn accepted~ position a® manager of the Middl~$ex Mills. 
In this l<Olcatioin, on December 9, 1871, he wai visited by the Grand Duke 
Alexhl, third son of the Czar, and Lowell h1&d one of itfSl most exciting 
days, After a visit to sieveral mills, the Grand Duke WQ$ entertained at 
dinner in the home of Fox, where the ho$t showed the Grand Duke the 
memorial$ which he had brought back from Russia. 
O<e:(i;;Silionally, but not often, Fox ~die public appearances in later 
d~y$l, He protested in a public letter again5it the ommiHion of any 
recognitilOln of nav~l her~es in the group~ on the baw-r~lief$ at the 
base of the monument on Bo$ton Common, He WS$ a member of the Appa-
lachicmn Mountain Club and often a.t.tietii®@ it$ meetings, even writing a· 
pa.mphl~t on Mount Kear sarge. In 187 8, he was\ one of the speaken at 
the gre&1t dinll1ler celebrating the cell'litie.nnial of Phillips Academy .28 
Later Fo:11: 1biec.ame a member of t.he lumber firm of Robert Mudge, Sawt:er, 
and Co'mpali1y im1 JB\01ton, He d:l..ed in New York City on October 29, 1883. 
Many ichall1iges .in the Union Navy were evident at the end of the Civil 
War as a result of Fox 0s activities during that four and a half year 
span. From itc1 confulS!ed state and hopele:s:S1 condition.at the start of 
the. war, the ,m,mvy inc.reu,ed its SJ hip® from ninety to 6 70, the. officers 
29 from 1300 to 6700, and the seamen fr~m 7500 to 51,500 by its end. 
Some two hundred vessels were built either at the navy yards by the 
114 
'government or at private shipyards under contract, and more than three 
hundred vessels were purchased. The net annual expenditures of the navy 
.30 
rose from $12,000,000 to $123,000,,000. Besides doing a yeoman job 
in getting an ironclad fleet for the navy, Fox fought for and got im-
proved construction of naval machinery and ordnance. 
The mo®t significant role played by Fox throughout the Civil War 
Will his planning am.id directing of operations for the Union Navy, both 
alone and in co-ordination with the army. The naval operations of the 
Civil War were the ll'OO)®t extensive ever undertaken by the navy. A block-
ade of the Southern states was successfully enforced, many important 
naval expeditions were projected and executeq, numerou~ rivers of the 
South and. West were actively patrolled,and the connnerce destroyers of 
the enemy were tr.11cked over distant seas;· At the beginning of the war 
the block&ilding of the. extensive coast of the Confederacy was deemed 
impoHible by many men, both_at home and abroad. To their surprise, 
thhl difficult undertaking was soon accomplished. The length of the 
coast blockaded, measured from Al<aJ!iandria, Virginia, to the ,1c Grande,, 
was 3549 miles. 189 opening, to river,, or indentatiorns of:the coast 
we:re guarded. On the MissiHip1Pi and its tributaries the gunboats 
trave:r.sed and patrolled .3615 miles; and on the sounds, bia:yous, rivers, 
and inlets of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, about 2,000 mqesj3l 
2':9,;,1. O. Paullin, 11President Limcoba and the Navy, n American 
Historical Review, XIV (1909), 284. 
JOibid. 
31 !~id., 285. 
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Ne~t in importance to the blockade were the naval operationi against the 
batteries, fort®, and fortified towns and cities on the sea coast and 
rivers of the Confederacy. As e~amples of thi$ cla~1 of operations, 
it is sufficient to mention the memorable achievements of Farragut at 
New Orleans, Vicksburg and Mobile, of Porter at Fort Fisher, and of Du= 
Pont and Dahlgren at Charleston. 
'" ,. 
Profes~ar John w. Churchill, emi~ent naval hi®torian and analJ$t, 
summed 'UPJ Fox~ s contribution to the Union during the Civil War~ '1By h.hl 
fertility of resource and quiet but persistent energy, he introduced the 
monitor into the naval service, brought order out of chaos in the Navy 
Department and' created out of almost nothing, an efficient navy. 1132 
32 · 
' F'ueH, '·'Gu®tavusi Vasa Follt, 11 Phillips Bulletin, XXI, 16. 
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